Randomized Legal Experimentation by Abramowicz, Michael B.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
Randomized Legal Experimentation 
Michael B. Abramowicz 
George Washington University Law School, abramowicz@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abramowicz, Michael B., "Randomized Legal Experimentation" (2008). GW Law Faculty Publications & 
Other Works. 230. 
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/230 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273875
Randomized Legal Experimentation 
 
Michael Abramowicz 
George Washington University 
 
 
Social scientists have performed and analyzed a number of randomized studies of 
policies, but the legal literature has not addressed whether and how the legal system 
should incorporate experimental methods. This Article identifies several benefits of 
randomized legal experimentation and argues that these benefits supports self-
executing experiments, whose results would lead to policy changes agreed upon in 
advance. Randomized experiments can generate information, and self-execution can 
help ensure that this information affects the policy process. Such experiments may be 
easier to enact than other legal reforms, because each side of a policy debate may 
believe that an experiment is likely to support its cause. This Article argues that 
administrative law doctrine should be more deferential to agency decisions to 
perform such experiments than to enact policies without evidence from randomized 
experiments. The Article describes the advantages and limitations of randomization, 
and explores ethical and equality-based arguments against experimentation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers and commentators frequently refer loosely to new laws and legal 
institutions as “experiments,”1 but in contrast to medical experimentation,2 these innovations 
almost never randomly designate treatment and control groups. There have been a handful of 
exceptions since 1968,3 randomized “social experiments” on the impact of government policies. 
But the legal literature has virtually ignored them. Legal scholars have discussed the results of 
particular social experiments,4 and occasionally have commented that additional social 
experiments could provide useful information in one field or another.5 But they have not 
addressed the normative question of whether the legal system should generally seek to 
incorporate experimental methods, and if so, what approaches the legal system might take to 
maximize the chance that experiments will improve policy.  
Perhaps viewing past social experiments as only incidentally involving government as the 
sponsor of research, legal scholars have been content to leave analysis of them to the social 
science literature. Unsurprisingly, that literature, like the economics literature on “field 
experiments,”6 has focused on what social scientists have learned about behavior from previous 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1151 (2008) 
(referring to a statute providing intellectual property protection for vessel hulls as a “legal experiment”); Theodor Meron, 
Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 551 (2006) (referring to the 
Nurenberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals as “a bold legal experiment”); Alan Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal 
Experiment, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 795 (1959) (characterizing restatements of law as a failed experiment). The most prominent 
academic account of experimental approaches to government also defines experimentation broadly, mentioning randomization as 
a possible ingredient of experimentation only once. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 348 (1998) (noting that systems for evaluating experiments “can themselves be 
benchmarked, and . . . can be combined with random-assignment experiments and other familiar methods of evaluation”). 
2 For a historical discussion of the introduction of randomization into statistical analysis in medicine, see Tar Timothy Chan, 
History of Statistical Thinking in Medicine, in ADVANCED MEDICAL STATISTICS 3, 11-14 (Ying Lu & Ji-Qian Fang eds., 2003). 
See also Ronald A. Fisher, The Arrangement of Field Experiments, 33 J. MIN. AGRIC. GREAT BRITAIN 503 (1926) (introducing the 
idea of the random trial). 
3 A doctoral student, Heather Ross, developed the idea for the experiment, on the effect of a negative income tax, and then 
received governmental funding. The experimental results are reported in three volumes. See 1-3 THE NEW JERSEY INCOME 
MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT (Harold W. Watts et al., 1976-1977). Useful summaries of the experiment are in SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION 95-143 (Jerry A. Hausman & David A. Wise eds., 1985); and DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 111-64 (2003). 
4 See, e.g., Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest in 
California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 655-57 (1997) (commenting on a Minneapolis experiment with randomized mandatory arrest of 
alleged domestic violence perpetrators). 
5 See, e.g., Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (proposing randomized experiments on procedural rules). 
6 For an overview of the recent research, see Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, Field Experiments, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 1009 (2004). 
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experiments and how to design future experiments to maximize such information.7 Scholars have 
paid some attention to the factors that influence governments’ decisions whether to create social 
experiments8 and ultimately to change policy as a result of them,9 as well as to the ethical 
considerations inherent in social experiments.10 They have not, however, theorized about the role 
that randomized experiments might and should play generally in governmental processes and 
legal doctrine. 
Perhaps in part as a result of this scholarly neglect, past social experiments have clustered 
in specific policy areas. As the label “social experimentation” suggests, most of the experiments 
have been in the area of social services, testing whether expenditures on entitlements succeed in 
achieving social goals such as reducing poverty.11 For example, a current experiment, executed 
under a Medicare statute requiring randomized testing of programs,12 is assessing whether 
telephone contact by nurses to at-risk Medicare patients will reduce program costs.13 Another 
class of randomized studies test criminal justice policies.14 A rare exception outside these two 
areas was a set of experiments on electricity pricing.15 None of the experiments randomly vary 
legal rights and obligations of ordinary citizens and entities in areas such as taxation or patent 
                                                                                                                                                             
These experiments test propositions such as whether offering matching donations increases charitable contributions, see, e.g., 
Stephan Meier, Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment, 5 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N 1203 (2007) (finding that offering matching donations to potential donors increases donation in the short run but 
decreases donation in the long run), or whether increased teacher attendance improves students’ educational performance, see 
Esther Duflo & Rema Hanna, Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School (NBER Working Paper No. 11880, Dec. 
2005) (finding that it does). 
7 These questions are, for example, the focus of SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3. 
8 See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 46-48. 
9 See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 48-63 (assessing the factors affecting the influence of experiments in the policymaking 
process). This analysis, however, does not consider experimental approaches developed in this Article, such as the possibility of 
self-executing experiments. 
10 See ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Tipane eds., 1975). 
11 “[M]ost social experiment test programs are targeted at persons or families who are somehow disadvantaged, particularly in 
terms of having low incomes.” GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 26. 
12 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 721 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395b-8) (requiring “development, testing, and evaluation of chronic care improvement programs using randomized controlled 
trials”). 
13 See NANCY MCCALL ET AL., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, EVALUATION OF PHASE 1 OF MEDICARE HEALTH 
SUPPORT (FORMERLY VOLUNTARY CHRONIC CARE IMPROVEMENT) PILOT PROGRAM UNDER TRADITIONAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
MEDICARE (June 2007); Reed Abelson, Medicare Finds How Hard It Is To Save Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at A1 
(describing the program). 
14 See generally David F. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, A Half Century of Randomized Experiments on Crime and Justice, 34 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55 (2006) (providing an overview of randomized criminal justice experiments, the first of which was initiated 
in 1951 and reported on in 1978).  
15 See SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3, at 11-53; see also RESEARCH TRIANGLE INST., ANALYTICAL MASTER PLAN FOR 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA FROM THE ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (1978). 
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law. Instead, they focus on possible provision of new services or on those who might be thought 
of as forfeiting rights by committing crimes.   
This Article advances a case for “legal experimentation,” using this phrase rather than 
“social experimentation” to highlight that such experimentation might be considered in almost 
any legal context, from civil procedure to tort law, from employment law to securities law. 
Experiments have the potential not merely to be governmentally funded academic exercises, but 
to serve as integral components of the legal process. The principal traditional justification for 
legal experimentation, that experimentation creates information, both overstates and understates 
its potential. Experimental data will rarely give unambiguous answers to multi-dimensional 
policy questions. The results of random experimentation will become just additional pieces of 
information available to decisionmakers, and there is little reason to expect that the influence of 
information will be proportional to its quality.16 But experiments could have greater impact if 
governments were to make policy conditional on experimental results. This Article will argue for 
self-executing randomized legal experiments. A self-executing experiment either could specify 
ex ante the policy effects of particular results, or, as in the Medicare experiment, could require 
independent decisionmakers to make policy changes based on the experiment.17 The hope is to 
nudge policy at least a small distance in what will generally be the right direction while avoiding 
some of the public choice hurdles and legislative inertia that often frustrate change. 
A self-executing experiment, of course, would still require legislative or administrative 
authorization, and so it cannot avoid these obstacles altogether. But if through gradual steps 
randomized self-executing experiments become sufficiently familiar that they no longer seem 
strange,18 then a culture of random legal experimentation might slowly emerge. Legal 
experiments should be easier to enact in this culture than are legal reforms in our present legal 
culture. A marginal decisionmaker, uncertain whether to support a program, should be more 
willing to favor it when the program will continue if and only if it turns out to be successful. 
Supporters of a program, meanwhile, may find it difficult to oppose a measure that would 
condition continuation of the program on confirmation of its success. Even opponents of moving 
                                                 
16 See infra Part II.A.1. 
17 See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text (describing self-executing features of the Medicare experiment). 
18 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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the law in the direction of an experiment might nonetheless be willing to support the experiment 
if they believe that it will turn out to be a failure.  
These effects may be sufficient to promote experimentation on the margins even in 
today’s legal culture, but in a mature legal experimental culture, norms could emerge that could 
further facilitate experimentation and legal change. We can imagine, for example, bidirectional 
self-executing experiments, which would move the law automatically in the direction of the 
experiment if it proves successful, and in the opposite direction if it fails. If ideological 
opponents genuinely disagree about the effects of potential policies, such experiments can seem 
beneficial ex ante to all, increasing the gains from political trade. Such experiments channel 
ideological disagreement, increasing the possibility of legal change rather than hardening 
impasse. Such experiments seem unlikely in our current legal system, but growing comfort with 
experimentation, randomization, and self-execution might someday make it so that opposition to 
such an experiment would be perceived as indicating that a policymaker lacked confidence in 
empirical claims advanced on behalf of a proposal. 
As a theoretical matter, this logic may best help justify creation of self-executing 
experiments in a legislature. But as a practical matter, self-executing legal experiments in the 
foreseeable future are more likely to originate in administrative agencies, though sometimes, as 
in the Medicare case, as a result of a legislative requirement. This Article is the first to consider 
how administrative law doctrine should contemplate legal experiments, and it argues that such 
doctrine should expressly recognize the benefits of experimentation. Courts would provide 
experimenting agencies more latitude when reviewing agency procedures, as well as factual, 
legal, and policy determinations, especially for programs that are randomized and self-executing, 
and even more so when self-execution is bidirectional. When agencies undertake legal 
experiments, there is generally a reduced risk that they are pursuing a particular ideological 
result, and the objectivity of randomized analyses should similarly reduce the potential for 
ideology in judicial review of agency decisions. 
These arguments highlight that we cannot consider legal experiments solely as a social 
scientist might. Rather, we must consider legal experimentation as a mechanism of the 
policymaking process, an imperfect device for converting scientific knowledge into law. 
Sometimes, the criteria of scientific usefulness and legal practicality point in different directions. 
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An experiment might be beneficial even if its results add little to social science knowledge; a 
simple randomization scheme may be beneficial even where econometricians would prefer a 
more elaborate treatment design; and an experiment might compare two legal approaches 
varying along a number of dimensions even though this may make the results difficult to 
interpret. The trade-off between scientific usefulness and legal practicality need not always be 
resolved in favor of a policy-oriented approach, however, and some legal problems, even where 
the fundamental policy questions are empirical, do not lend themselves to randomized 
experimentation. This Article will draw on a wide variety of hypothetical experiments, but not all 
of these hypotheticals are designed to illustrate virtues of this approach. Many are chosen 
because they illustrate challenges for legal experimentation. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II assesses the benefits of legal experimentation 
generally, arguing that it can improve information relevant to the policymaking process (though 
this does not guarantee that the information will be used), that it can increase the chance of 
moving the law in a direction that a median legislator would favor, and that it increases electoral 
accountability by making legislators’ goals more transparent. It also assesses the prospects for 
legal experimentation by legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts, and it compares legal 
experimentation to alternative means of securing more independent and scientific 
decisionmaking, such as sunset clauses, reporting requirements, delegation to administrative 
agencies, and privatization. Part III explains from both statistical and policy perspectives why 
randomized experiments are likely to be more useful than nonrandomized evaluations, while also 
considering a variety of hazards of randomized experiments and what these hazards mean for 
legal experiments. Finally, Part IV provides some guidelines for legal experimentation and 
directly considers ethical and other objections to randomization and to self-execution. 
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION 
This Part identifies benefits of experimental government in various institutional contexts 
and compares experimentation to other devices serving similar goals. Part II.A explains that in a 
pluralist policymaking environment, experimentation can improve political debate and enhance 
policy, particularly if randomized, self-executing experiments became entrenched in political 
practice. Part II.B assesses the suitability of legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts for 
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instituting beneficial experiments, and Part II.C compares experimentation to sunset clauses, 
reporting requirements, delegation to independent agencies, and privatization.  
A. The Benefits of Experimental Government 
Experimental government can improve policy in several ways: experiments can generate 
information, experiments can facilitate the passage of reforms, and debate about experimentation 
can make legislators’ goals more transparent. The challenge is not merely producing information, 
but also beneficially influencing the policy process. Randomization can help simplify 
information and make the purpose of an experiment, and thus legislators’ aims, more apparent. 
Self-execution can guarantee that experimentation influences the public, turning disagreement 
into a force that makes policy change easier, while also helping to make legislators’ goals 
explicit. 
1. Information Generation 
The most obvious defense of legal experimentation is that it can produce information not 
otherwise obtainable. This insight applies even to nonrandom experimentation. Implementation 
of a proposed policy will usually provide better evidence of the policy’s effects than speculation. 
Consider, for example, no fault automobile insurance. When no jurisdiction had enacted no fault 
automobile insurance, academics could speculate about its likely effects, such as an increase in 
accidents and a per case decrease in litigation expenses.19 But attempts to gauge these effects’ 
magnitudes involve guesswork.20 Once a jurisdiction adopts no fault insurance, observers can 
casually assess the empirical effects. Nonetheless, such assessments are prone to error. For 
example, a rise in accidents after adoption of no fault insurance could be a result of some 
independent cause, could be related in an indirect way (for example, if a new political party 
assuming office and had enacted numerous policies including no-fault), or a transient statistical 
fluke. This highlights limitations of a nonrandom experiment: the treatment cannot be isolated 
and the decision to treat may be an endogenous function of the policy environment.21 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 
(1965) (assessing the advantages and disadvantages of a no-fault liability system). 
20 See Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 MD. L. REV. 12, 18-19, 21 (2005) 
(noting that Calabresi’s work makes numerous theoretical claims without empirical support). 
21 Careful researchers attempt to account for these limitations. See, e.g., J. David Cummins et al., The Incentive Effects of No-
Fault Automobile Insurance, 44 J.L. & ECON. 427 (2001) (offering an empirical analysis of no-fault insurance that takes into 
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Suppose, in contrast, that a state randomly selected half of its citizens to switch to a no 
fault insurance regime, while the other half continued to have fault-based insurance,22 and 
allowed insurers to charge differential prices. The state might then monitor variables such as 
insurance premiums, accident rates, and litigation costs, for example by imposing a reporting 
requirement on insurers. There might be difficulties in extrapolating what these variables would 
be if the jurisdiction switched entirely to no fault insurance,23 but this approach helps to 
overcome the problems of an uncontrolled experiment. Any other simultaneous legal or nonlegal 
changes in the state cannot explain any significant differences between the two populations. 
When properly randomized, the treatment decision is exogenous. Even if there is only a small 
chance that such an experiment would succeed, this possibility could trigger a lasting legal 
change, so the additional information gained could produce expected social benefits outweighing 
expected costs. 
 Commentators have occasionally remarked that social experiments will benefit society 
only if they influence policy.24 David Mundel, for example, has argued that to assess 
experiments we must ask whether they answer important policy questions, whether the answers 
are understandable, and whether understandable answers can alter the beliefs of policymakers.25 
Even this breakdown is incomplete, because policymakers with changed beliefs might not act on 
those beliefs, for example because interest groups oppose a policy change. The focus of the 
social experimentation literature has been how to design experiments to produce reliable policy 
answers,26 perhaps on the implicit premise that better studies will be more likely to clear each of 
                                                                                                                                                             
account the endogeneity of the decision to adopt such insurance). Statisticians might debate, however, whether any such attempt 
is successful. 
22 A complication with this approach is that individuals with fault-based insurance might end up in accidents with individuals 
with no fault insurance. The legal regime must adopt some approach to dealing with such accidents. For example, the law might 
pick one approach or the other to use in such cases, or it might stipulate that only a party with fault-based insurance can be liable 
for the other party’s injuries on account of fault. In a federal system, the law must deal with such incompatibilities anyway. See, 
e.g., Michael W. Mengis, Conflict of Laws: Insurance, 47 LA. L. REV. 1213, 1220-23 (1987) (detailing conflict-of-law rules 
involving automobile accidents). With a large enough treatment group, it should still be possible at least to obtain an approximate 
sense of the effects of a shift from fault to no fault insurance. 
23 During an experiment, any given driver may be less likely to know what regime applies to that driver than if a legal change 
were permanent. 
24 See Jerry A. Hausman & David A. Wise, Introduction, in SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3, at 1, 2 (“[S]ince, to a large 
extent, the policy questions the experiments were designed to answer still have not been decided, the final accounting of the 
worth of the experiments in helping to decide the course of public policy is probably fairly far off into the future.”). 
25 David S. Mundel, The Use of Information in the Policy Process: Are Social-Policy Experiments Worthwhile, in SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3, at 251, 252. 
26 Hausman & Wise, supra note 24, at 1 (“[T]he most important question is whether the experiments have been successful in 
their primary goal of providing precise estimates of the effects of a proposed government policy.”). 
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these hurdles. Some relaxation of the goal of scientific purity, however, could sometimes 
facilitate each of Mundel’s steps and promote the ultimate goal of creating new policy.  
First, experiments, though reducing uncertainty, will rarely provide definitive answers 
about whether particular legislation should be adopted. The treatments employed in a random 
experiment will often not correspond unambiguously to policy options. For example, the RAND 
Health Insurance Experiment assessed coinsurance requirements’ effect on health services 
utilization and outcomes.27 But no legislation focused specifically on coinsurance, and those who 
opposed the experiment pointed out that “the insurance plans included in the HIE did not 
correspond directly to the policy options being considered by Congress at the time.”28 The 
experiment may have influenced individual health care reformers.29 But it is doubtful that it 
materially affected the viability of any legislation. A social experiment focusing on one 
dimension of a problem leaves room for debate about the effects of a policy initiative with many 
other dimensions. This suggests one difference between scientific and legal goals in 
experimental design. The RAND experiment targeted concrete, scientifically manageable 
questions.30 An experiment designed around a legal proposal—for example, randomizing some 
people to a single payer plan and requiring those individuals to pay any higher taxes needed to 
fund it—might have been less scientifically useful, because it would have been difficult to 
identify which elements of the plan produced certain results. But it might have been more legally 
useful, providing direct assessments of a proposed legal reform taken as a whole.31 
                                                 
27 See Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Some Interim Results from a Controlled Trial of Cost Sharing in Health Insurance, 305 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1501 (1981) (providing the first reported results on the experiment). 
28 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 73.  
29 For example, economists helping to develop the details of President Clinton’s health plan used the RAND results in setting 
parameters in simulation models designed to assess the ramifications of different options. Id. at 77-81. It seems plausible that if 
that health plan had been enacted into law, some of the law’s features might have been traceable to the results of the RAND 
experiment. 
30 At least some commentators have drawn sweeping conclusions from the RAND Experiment. For example, a major finding of 
the experiment was that greater use of health services did not improve health outcomes. Some commentators have argued that 
this suggests that there might be overuse of health care and that the government should not be subsidizing it. See, e.g., Robin 
Hanson, RAND Health Insurance Experiment, http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/05/rand_health_ins.html, 
31 In other experiments as well, critics have argued that the experiments’ focus on a few variables has made them useless for 
broader policy analysis. Harvey Rosen, for example, argued that results from a randomized housing experiment “offer no 
particular advantages” over nonrandomized observational data. “[H]ousing behavior is so complex and the policy environment so 
uncertain that simple comparisons of experimental and control groups are unlikely to be of much interest,” he argued. Harvey S. 
Rosen, Housing Behavior and the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program: What Have We Learned, in SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3, at 55, 72. “Rather, the data must be interpreted with the help of theoretical and statistical 
models.” Id.  
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 Second, scientific and legal goals may also be in tension for Mundel’s next criterion, 
whether the results are understandable. An advantage of random experimentation is that it can 
make statistical results accessible.32 Even a statistical naïf can informally compare treatment and 
comparison groups. Sophisticated econometric techniques can correct for potential problems in 
random experimentation.33 The typical scientific instinct would be to apply such corrections, but 
these techniques are not methodologically simple or uncontroversial. Similarly, statisticians 
might test subsamples to determine whether the intervention has different effects on different 
individuals or communities.34 What makes results more understandable and meaningful to a 
neutral expert statistician may make the results less useful in the policymaking process.35 
Sometimes, policy should depend on analysis beyond a raw comparison of treatment and 
comparison groups. But given the difficulties of identifying the objectively best way to massage 
data, it often may be preferable for a legal system to insist in advance on a single relatively good 
comparison rather than to strive for a perfect one.36 
 Third, even if results are understandable to a public official who takes the time to study 
them, they might not affect public officials’ beliefs. Henry Aaron has noted skeptically, “In the 
policy forum, social science research is ‘evidence’ to be introduced as part of a frequently 
multifaceted adversary process in which each side builds its case to make it as persuasive as 
                                                 
32 Mundel notes, “If properly conceived and analyzed, social experiments can result in simply stated and easily understood 
conclusions.” Mundel, supra note 25, at 254. The problem is that if there are multiple competing analyses, conclusions can 
become muddier. 
33 An example of such a problem is the possibility of differential attrition in the treatment and comparison groups. See infra Part 
III.B.1.b.i. 
34 A problem with this approach is that with enough subsamples tested, there is a high probability that a simple regression 
analysis will produce spurious statistically significant results on some subsamples. 
35 Hausman and Wise recognize this point: “[T]he use of complex structural models to analyze the data from social experiments 
… are often in contradiction to the primary motivation for the experiments and thus subvert their intent; they are often 
inconsistent with the raison d’être of experiments.” Jerry A. Hausman & David A. Wise, Technical Problems in Social 
Experimentation: Cost Versus Ease of Analysis, in SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3, at 187, 190. The primary motivation 
they allude to is the goal of producing simple and clear answers to scientific problems.  
36 Some observers have complained that the data from past experiments were less useful as a result of attempts to make the data 
useful for the policy process. Paul Joskow, for example, assessed experiments on the effects of charging higher electricity prices 
at times of peak demand. See Paul L. Joskow, Comment, in SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3, at 42. The policy debate was 
between environmentalists, who insisted that higher prices could reduce peak demand “so as to reduce the need for additional 
power plants,” id. at 44, and electric utilities that were skeptical that demand would be responsive to prices. Joskow complains 
that the experiments thus ended up focusing on what should have been uncontroversial from an economic perspective, that “the 
elasticity of demand for electricity was negative.” Id. Yet one might argue that from a policy perspective, even if disagreement 
focused on an elementary question of economics, it was useful for the experiments to target this question directly, rather than to 
introduce many experimental variations that would produce more information for interested scientists yet less understandable 
results for public policy. 
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possible.”37 Mundel more charitably describes policy makers as “classically Bayesian—entering 
a problem with an estimate of the likely outcome and an estimate of the variance of uncertainty 
surrounding the likely outcome,” and then changing these estimates based on evidence emerging 
from experiments.38 But the degree to which policymakers adjust their beliefs may not be 
proportionate to the quality of evidence,39 especially if policymakers are not perfect Bayesians, 
but instead, as the cognitive psychology literature suggests,40 filter new information to fit with 
their pre-existing views. Cognitive psychology also suggests that more salient experiments may 
have greater influence on policymakers’ views.41 Salience will be maximized with a prior 
agreement on the conditions for determining whether an experiment will be counted as a 
“success” or a “failure.” There is some danger that simplistic labels can lead policy in the wrong 
direction, but this danger must be balanced against the chance that subtle findings will have no 
policy influence. 
 Fourth, self-executing experiments substitute for the final step that Mundel’s analysis 
neglected: the conversion of an experiment into legal policy. Even a policymaker who is 
genuinely swayed by a non-self-executing experiment might not admit it,42 for fear of seeming 
inconsistent or of alienating supporters. A policymaker might point to the results of other studies, 
even less rigorous ones.43 Or, a policymaker might note independent justifications for the 
                                                 
37 Henry Aaron, Comment, in SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3, at 272, 275. 
38 Mundel, supra note 25, at 255. 
39 Policymakers may also pretend not to adjust their views. Lant Pritchett has suggested that perhaps one reason for experiments’ 
lack of influence is that policymakers may not support rigorous analysis of programs they support because they fear that doing so 
will make it more difficult to these programs. See Lant Pritchett, It Pays to be Ignorant: A Simple Political Economy of Rigorous 
Program Evaluation, 5 J. POL’Y REFORM 251 (2002); see also Michael Kremer, Randomized Evaluations of Educational 
Programs in Developing Countries: Some Lessons, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 102, 105 (2003) (discussing Pritchett’s view). 
40 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature 
Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1506 (1998) (discussing cognitive dissonance). 
41 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law 
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1090 (2000) (“[A]n understanding of the availability heuristic can provide a caution to 
policymakers tempted to enact new regulatory regimes in response to highly available information concerning health or safety 
risks.”). 
42 Some policymakers may offer candid acknowledgments that their initial instincts were wrong. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
for example, who championed experiments on a negative income tax, admitted that the results seemed to cut against his initial 
views. See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 144 (quoting Sen. Moynihan as saying, “[W]e were wrong about a guaranteed 
income! Seemingly it is calamitous…. Such is not the state of the science, and it seems to me we are honor-bound to abide by it 
for the moment.”). But Sen. Moynihan had achieved renown as a scholar, and might have been in a better position to admit being 
persuaded by new data than other politicians. 
43 Flawed studies may receive a great deal of political and media attention. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Strategies of Research 
Design in the Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 111, 125 (1966-1967) 
(noting that studies assessing the effect of a single law in a particular jurisdiction “tend[] to be very misleading to the public at 
large, yet … often are publicized widely”). 
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policymaker’s initial preferences. Self-execution overcomes disingenuous resistance to an 
experiment’s conclusions, but it may appear to make the final policy decision less scientific. A 
self-executing experiment determines policy based on a mere proxy for policy effectiveness. It 
only changes the policy baseline, but an official label of an experiment as being a success or a 
failure may obscure more subtle information revealed by an experiment. On the other hand, 
policymakers often pay more attention to whether particular variables are significant than to the 
magnitudes of the corresponding statistical effects,44 when they pay attention to experimental 
results at all.45 Whether a self-executing experiment produces a numeric result exceeding a 
predetermined threshold may be no less effective a proxy.  
The legal system need not always rely on simplified self-executing experiments for 
information to have an effect on public policy. Sometimes, policymakers might incorporate 
experimental results in a thoughtful, nonideological way. Perhaps this is true of the current 
Medicare experiments, although the creation of an institutionalized experiment generation and 
evaluation mechanism may itself be conceived as akin to a self-executing experiment. At other 
times, any attempt to reduce a particular experiment ex ante to a single metric labeled “success” 
or “failure” may itself be so flawed that there is an unacceptably high risk of incorporating bad 
information into the policy process. But often for experiments producing information in political 
settings, less may be more. 
2. Reform Facilitation 
The analysis so far has focused on an experiment’s aftermath, rather than on its initiation. 
This section addresses whether experimentation promotes or substitutes for legal reform. Maybe 
“experiments are conducted to replace real action with symbolic action and thereby serve as an 
inherently conservative form.”46 Sometimes an experiment might be used to take an issue off the 
public policy agenda until political storms pass.47 But this could backfire, because experiments 
                                                 
44 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 144 (reporting that in the income maintenance experiments, “evidence on the existence of 
the effect tended to receive much more notice within political circles than evidence on the size of the effect,” even though the 
intent of many researchers was to show that while some effect existed, it was relatively small). 
45 Some apparently important results in social experiments have received little attention. For example, one result of the income 
maintenance experiments was that subsidized training voucher programs, giving recipients choice of what training to undertake, 
failed to increase earnings. See id. at 129. 
46 Id. at 47.  
47 In experiments on whether welfare recipients could be induced to take jobs, “welfare directors in states that were testing 
welfare-to-work innovations on a pilot basis liked being able to hold off state legislatures until they could learn about the 
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provide “rigorous tests of policies” and thus may further support for reform.48 This is especially 
so with random experimentation, which produces relatively rigorous and comprehensible results. 
Use of experiments to defuse calls for reform might be unproblematic anyway. First, delaying 
decisions after a crisis may ensure that policy is based on more rational reactions, relatively free 
from cognitive biases overemphasizing factors of high salience.49 Second, other mechanisms 
already allow policymakers to put off issues. Policymakers can form study committees, or pass 
symbolic reform. Experiments probably do not much increase the opportunities that 
policymakers have to avoid contentious issues. 
More importantly, there are more powerful forces by which experimentation could 
encourage legal reform. Consider a marginal policymaker, who is unsure about whether to 
support a particular policy change. An experiment is an initiative that this policymaker might 
well support, subject to concerns such as cost, because of the information that it produces. 
Meanwhile, policymakers who favor some legal reform may support an experiment if they are 
not sufficiently numerous to push through the legal change on their own and if the experiment 
may sway enough votes. On this theory, policymakers are likely to support precisely those 
experiments that have the best chance of producing information that ultimately will lead to 
reform. 
Where there are competing proposals on an issue, experimentation may receive even 
more support. Suppose that liberals favor Plan L, conservatives favor Plan C, and moderates are 
uncertain, and suppose further that in the absence of experimentation, the status quo will be 
maintained. Then, all three camps might well favor experimentation on some disputed empirical 
aspect of the issue, because each side might anticipate that the experiment will verify its 
empirical claim and bring the uncommitted to that side. With experimentation, disagreement on 
empirics counterintuitively may make political bargains easier to strike. It may then seem 
surprising that there is so little experimentation, particularly so little of the random 
experimentation that seems especially likely to influence the uncommitted. A partial explanation 
is that this theory works only if the experiment has some realistic chance of influencing enough 
                                                                                                                                                             
effectiveness of the innovation.” Id. at 219. 
48 Id. 
49 See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999) 
(describing how the availability heuristic can lead to impetuous regulation). 
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moderate policymakers to lead to permanent enactment. The typical experiment may be of such 
low political salience that this will rarely be true. 
Indeed, non-self-executing randomized experiments may be of lower salience than 
nonrandomized experiments that change the status quo for an entire population. 
Conceptualization of experiments as academic exercises may partially explain why they are 
generally no larger than necessary to produce needed information for policymakers. Random 
experimentation may appear from a budgetary perspective to crowd out other academic research. 
Yet many policies, even with uncertainty about empirical effects, are enacted either on a 
nonrandomized or entirely nonexperimental basis, with far larger budgetary consequence. If 
randomized experiments seemed a natural part of policy development, then experimental 
proposals might be evaluated using ordinary informal cost-benefit criteria, rather than competing 
for scarce research funding. At sufficient scale, the results of randomized experiments might then 
penetrate general political discourse. But randomized experiments are unlikely to seem natural 
until they are used more often, a chicken-and-egg problem. 
The possibility of self-executing experiments could provide an escape from this dilemma. 
Ideological opponents might agree to a self-executing experiment even where in the absence of 
self-execution, the result of an experiment would not seem likely to affect policymakers’ 
decisions. Self-execution will be attractive when ideological opponents have genuinely different 
beliefs about expected empirical outcomes. With self-execution, each side seeks not necessarily 
to persuade the other, but to take advantage of the other side’s flawed expectations. Admittedly, 
self-executing experiments face a chicken-and-egg problem of their own. The self-executing 
nature of an experiment may itself provoke resistance.50 A principal goal of this Article is to 
build the case for self-executing experiments, but no academic article seems likely to change 
convention enough on its own. If self-executing experiments are to become a prominent part of 
the policy landscape, they will likely emerge in small steps, such as the ongoing Medicare 
experiment.51 Such experiments, even if not scientifically definitive, might come to be perceived 
as generally shifting policy baselines in a beneficial direction.  
                                                 
50 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
51 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text; infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
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The changes that self-executing experiments effect will not always be beneficial. A 
plausible assumption, however, is that when policymakers are able to approve a policy through 
standard constitutionally specified means, welfare is more likely to increase than decrease. On 
this assumption, if experimentation ultimately facilitates permanent legal changes, we tally those 
changes as expected improvements. This assumption, by refusing to privilege the status quo over 
change, implicitly rejects the possibility that a “law of unintended consequences” means that 
well-intentioned experiments will have harmful results more often than not. If legal change is 
generally undesirable, then any mechanism for increasing consensus for legal change will be 
harmful. Arguably, self-execution increases the dangers of unintended consequences, because 
policy is specified on the basis of experiments that have not yet occurred and cannot yet be fully 
evaluated. Randomization, however, at least alleviates the dangers through rigorous testing. 
3. Goal Transparency 
Experimentation also may promote public accountability by making policymakers’ goals 
more transparent to constituents. A policymaker may announce concerns with some particular 
public policy variable—say, whether reduction of welfare will promote job creation—but 
agreeing to an experiment that will test the effect of a policy makes this alleged commitment 
more credible. As importantly, a policymaker who claims to oppose a policy because of a 
concern about a potential effect may find it hard to oppose an experiment that would reveal 
whether this effect exists. Some policymakers might argue that they think an idea is so bad that 
even experimenting with it is ill-advised, but especially if experimentation became more 
common, opposition might signal that a policymaker’s true concern is not the one publicly 
stated. 
Randomized experiments can augment goal transparency, because randomization 
enhances the transparency of the experiments themselves. Randomized experiments can allow 
for simple comparisons of the treatment and control populations. A proposal to conduct a 
randomized experiment can thus make clear what is being tested. When a policymaker 
announces a proposal for a randomized experiment of a policy that the policymaker claims will 
have a particular effect, the public can have relatively high confidence that the policymaker 
genuinely believes this. Because randomization constrains the degree to which a policymaker 
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can spin experimental results,52 a policymaker who supports a new permanent policy will be 
willing to accept randomized experimentation only if there is a sufficiently high chance that the 
experiment will be successful. The willingness of a policymaker who supports a program to 
subject it to randomized testing supports the honesty of the policymaker’s claims. Opponents of 
a particular initiative similarly might suggest randomization to enhance their empirical claims. 
Proposals for random experimentation thus can be useful even if the results of 
experimentation could be readily predicted by policy insiders. Such proposals focus debate 
around the empirical effects of a policy and allow the public to gauge better what insiders think 
the effects of a policy might be. Admittedly, if randomized experiments are viewed as mere 
academic studies, a policymaker’s proposal of a randomized experiment might receive little 
attention in a broader policy debate. Meanwhile, a proponent of a policy might not see any 
political need to respond to an opponent’s suggestion of an experiment. The goal transparency 
advantages of experimentation may thus require experimentation to become more deeply 
embedded in policymaking culture. 
If such a culture did develop in some agency or legislature, then debate might ensue not 
just about whether there should be an experiment, but also about what precisely should be tested 
in the experiment. The possibility of experimentation should lead both sides to trim extravagant 
policy claims. If either side endorses only a partial step to a controversial policy, the other side 
might point out that this suggests fear about a test of a fully-implemented policy. Proponents thus 
will not want to advocate a policy that opponents would be all too happy to test in a high-profile 
experiment. Opponents, meanwhile, will not want to overstate the allegedly dire consequences of 
a policy, lest they inadvertently lower the implicit threshold for judging the experiment’s 
success.  
With self-execution, this implicit threshold becomes explicit, an agreed-upon benchmark 
for assessing an experiment’s success. Negotiation on such a benchmark could increase the goal 
transparency of experimentation, because policymakers are forced not only to identify a policy, 
but also to specify a basis for measurement and a threshold that would count as success. Once 
again, partisans would confront tradeoffs. For proponents, insistence on too low a benchmark of 
                                                 
52 I do not mean to claim that policymakers will never find bases for arguing in favor of continuing experimental policies that 
appear to have failed. For example, in the recent Medicare experiments, after preliminary data suggested that the experiment 
might fail, some legislators cautioned against cancellation of the experiment on the ground that those who had benefited from the 
experiment might suffer if it were discontinued. See Abelson, supra note 13. 
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success would signal that the proponents do not believe that the policy has a good chance of 
achieving greater success. For a job training assistance experiment, if proponents claim that it 
would be a success if there is a one percent increase in employment in the treatment group 
relative to the control group, the opponents might respond that the job training is too expensive 
to justify such an increase. Promising too much, however, risks the experiment failing. Similarly, 
for opponents of a policy, insisting on too great a benefit might seem to concede that an 
experiment is expected to produce some benefit.  
This analysis assumes that a self-executing experiment would be focused on just a single 
policy dimension (such as increased employment). It would also be possible, however, for the 
criterion of success to depend on some formula aggregating multiple dimensions. For example, if 
there is debate about how much job retraining would cost, policymakers might agree that the 
experiment should be viewed as a success if each increased job costs the government no more 
than a set amount of money. By creating an easily understood cost measure that incorporates 
multiple dimensions of a policy problem, policymakers could further increase goal transparency. 
It would also be possible to create more elaborate formulas that take into account a larger 
number of criteria, but past a certain point, increased complexity, however desirable from a 
policy standpoint, may make debate on experimentation less transparent.  
However numerous the measurements of a policy’s effect, a self-executing experiment 
need not necessarily focus on a narrow proposal. Altering only one policy variable may allow for 
a more scientific assessment, isolating that variable from other policy dimensions. Nonetheless, 
testing an entire, multi-dimensional policy may make more sense from a policy perspective. 
Within the policy process, it may matter not so much why a particular proposal worked (though 
such information would be helpful for later policies), but whether it worked according to the 
agreed-on criteria. A self-executing experiment that directly tests a policy that some 
policymakers in fact wish to implement may be most useful from the perspective of goal 
transparency, even when it may be difficult to understand which of many aspects of the policy 
ultimately were responsible for any beneficial effects. An experimental test of an entire policy 
makes it difficult for those disappointed by the experimental results to dismiss those results as 
irrelevant to actual policy or attributable to an artificial experimental environment. 
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Indeed, the most promising self-executing experiments might be bidirectional ones that 
offer two treatment groups (perhaps with a control group representing the status quo policy as 
well), rather than a treatment group and a single control group. Suppose, for example, that 
different legislators have opposite views about securities disclosure regulation, with some 
arguing that more stringent regulations would benefit shareholders,53 and others insisting that 
excessive disclosure regulation harms shareholders.54 A randomized experiment could randomly 
assign all the regulated corporations to either the “more stringent” or “more relaxed” testing 
group, whether or not some randomly selected corporations continue to operate under the status 
quo regulations. The policymakers might agree that after some evaluation period,55 the two 
treatment groups will be compared, for example by assessing the average stock price increase in 
the two groups.56 If one group outperformed the other by at least a set margin, then the law 
assigned to that group could automatically be extended to apply to all other firms.57 
B. Possibilities for Institutional Realization 
The benefits of experimental government may be more than the sum of the benefits of 
individual experiments. Rather, the existence of an experimental legal culture—that is, of a 
government in which experiments are a common feature of the policymaking process—could 
focus debate on the empirical effects of policies and constrain policymakers who might make 
unsupportable empirical claims. An experimental legal culture, however, seems likely to emerge 
only if legal experimentation gradually becomes more common, building on legal experiments 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
417 (1996) (defending disclosure rules on the ground that they subsidize informed trading and therefore improve capital market 
liquidity). 
54 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359,  2373-
81 (1998) (providing an empirical critique of federal securities disclosure regulation). 
55 The evaluation period would need to be long enough for the difference in regulation to make a sufficient difference. Given the 
existing disagreement about which disclosure regime will maximize share price, there also might not be agreement about how 
long would be needed for stock price to be impacted. Of course, an experiment that reveals that the stock price differences 
between the two groups is small would itself be useful.  
56 It would also be possible to take into account other variables, such as the variance in stock price over time. 
57 A slightly different approach would be for the selected legal regime to be extended immediately only to the firms still 
governed by the status quo, with the firms receiving the lesser treatment required to follow that treatment for some additional 
years. There are at least two possible justifications for this approach. First, there might be high transition costs in switching 
regulatory regimes. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002) (arguing 
that transition costs must be considered in making decisions about whether to adopt new legislation).  Second, the treatment will 
have a greater impact on stock price if it is expected to endure. With a temporary treatment, the stock price will reflect 
anticipation that the treatment will be removed, and thus the only stock price effects will be from changed disclosure practices 
during the treatment period.  
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credited with providing valuable information. This Part assesses the potential virtues of an 
experimental legal culture in particular policymaking institutions, while also considering shorter 
term feasibility. A legislative experimental culture might be especially useful, but development 
of such a culture seems more likely to emerge in administrative agencies. The view from the 
Progressive era that administrative agencies can and should approach policy in a scientific way 
retains some political attraction.58  Courts could benefit from experimentation as well, but such 
experimentation seems less appropriate when initiated by individual judges than by bodies 
overseeing the judiciary. 
1. Legislatures 
The benefits of self-execution and randomization would be at their apex with legislative 
bodies. The past history of experimentation suggests that legislatures ordinarily pay little 
attention to experimental results,59 so randomization may be useful as a way of ensuring that 
information is distilled in an easily digestible and relatively incontrovertible form. Self-
execution, meanwhile, may be necessary as a means of ensuring that policies can be enacted into 
law. Because legislatures will generally reflect a broad range of ideological views, which may 
correlate with predictions about the empirical effects of policies, self-executing randomized 
experiments can be designed in a way that makes those on both sides of an issue believe that they 
will ultimately benefit, thus helping to facilitate passage of legislation. And finally, because 
legislators are electorally accountable to the public, the goal transparency of experimentation 
might be both particularly useful and effective. 
Yet a culture of experimentation may be particularly hard to achieve in legislative bodies. 
Such bodies are procedurally conservative.60 Backlash against randomization and self-execution 
may be particularly powerful in the legislative context. If constituents believe that legal 
randomization is inherently unfair,61 legislators will likely resist it, or at least will want any 
                                                 
58 See generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal 
Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1131-32 (2000) (providing a historical overview of Progressive era views of administrative 
agencies). 
59 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
60 Rules of legislative procedure do evolve, but slowly. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decision Making, 
and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 976-78 (1989) (tracing the evolution of parliamentary procedure in the United 
States). 
61 Cf. Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Randomization with Asymmetric Information, 19 RAND J. ECON. 344, 360 (1988) 
(noting that lotteries are generally viewed as fair in some situations, such as a military draft, and unfair in others, such as where 
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concrete experiments to emanate from administrative agencies rather than the legislature, to 
defuse responsibility. For an experimental legislative culture to develop, society generally must 
gain more comfort with randomization. Conceivably, the private sector’s increased reliance in 
recent years on randomized experimentation62 could help, though such practices could anger 
consumers and produce a backlash.63 A more plausible road to public acceptance would be high-
profile random experiments initiated by administrative agencies.  
2. Administrative Agencies 
The current Medicare experimentation for improving chronic care illustrates both the 
promise of administrative agency experimentation and its limits. The statute provides “for the 
development, testing, and evaluation of chronic care improvement programs using randomized 
controlled trials.”64 This is, admittedly, the most familiar form of experimental randomization, 
applying to consenting65 individuals undergoing medical treatment. The test, however, is of a 
governmental program, rather than of a drug. The statute, moreover, provides for self-execution 
in the form of an independent evaluation of the randomized controlled trials,66 specifying that if 
the agency finds the program to be successful according to specified criteria,67 it shall expand the 
program “to additional geographic areas,” possibly “includ[ing] the implementation of the 
program on a national basis.”68 
It should not be surprising that this experimentation is located within an administrative 
agency. Whether or not legislatures are well-equipped to specify technical details such as those 
of experimental protocols, legislatures have traditionally left such details to administrative 
agencies. Moreover, a defense of delegation is agency expertise, and random experimentation is 
a familiar tool of scientific experts. Finally, agencies routinely have rulemaking power, enabling 
                                                                                                                                                             
randomization produces horizontal inequity). 
62 See generally IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 46-63 (2007). 
63 For example, consumers sometimes resent it when online retailers charge different consumers different prices. See, e.g., Robert 
M. Weiss & Ajay K. Mehrotra, Online Dynamic Pricing: Efficiency, Equity and the Future of E-Commerce, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
11, 11 (2001) (discussing consumer reaction to dynamic pricing by Amazon.com). 
64 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-8(b)(1). 
65 The statute does not specifically require that consent be obtained, but the agency administering the experiments limited the 
program to consenting patients. See MCCALL ET AL., supra note 21, at 22.  
66 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-8(b)(6). 
67 Id. § 1395b-8(c)(2). 
68 Id. § 1395-b-8(c)(1). 
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them to adjust their programs and procedures, incorporating new information from any source. 
The legislative instruction that the agency consider the experimental results reinforces what the 
agency ought do in any event. In short, such experimentation fits within existing conceptions of 
the administrative function. 
The Medicare experiment might itself deserve to be counted as a success even if the 
underlying program is labeled a failure; showing that a program fails is as important as showing 
that one succeeds. The experiment’s benchmark for the program, however, is not an ideal model 
for future experiments. A program can be successful only if it “improve[s] the clinical quality of 
care,” “improve[s] beneficiary satisfaction,” and meets goals of “budget neutrality.”69 That is, a 
program would count as a failure if it improved care, but cost money rather than saves money. 
The statute does not provide for a cost-benefit analysis that would allow all improvements to 
care that are cost-justified. Nor does it test existing programs to determine whether any benefits 
that they provide are in fact cost-justified.70 It may be easier for a legislature to require an 
administrative agency to implement experimentation in search of a free lunch than to use 
experimentation to explore program tradeoffs. 
Another limitation of the Medicare experimentation is that it is limited to a specific area 
of concern within the Medicare program, the improvement of chronic care. More ambitious 
legislation would require Medicare to experiment systematically with every aspect of care, 
including financial details such as payments to physicians71 and coinsurance requirements.72 Yet 
another level of ambition would be to experiment with legal issues such as malpractice73 or to 
lower or raise the extent of privatization in Medicare.74 Perhaps successes could lead to broader 
scale use of experimentation, but these successes would need to trigger a rethinking of the 
function of an administrative agency, from an entity that applies existing knowledge to one that 
systematically generates knowledge in the face of empirical uncertainty.  
                                                 
69 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-8(c)(2).  
70 A concern about such a test would be that existing program participants will not likely consent to participating in an 
experiment in which they might receive fewer benefits. See infra Part IV.B.1.a (assessing whether consent ought to be required). 
71 See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer et al., Can Money Buy Quality? Physician Response to Pay for Performance, 3 IND. HEALTH 
L. REV. 445 (2006) (assess plans for Medicare and private insurers to tie physician reimbursement to measures of performance). 
72 See, e.g., William C. Hsiao & Nancy L. Kelly, Medicare Benefits: A Reassessment, 62 MILBANK Q. 207, 212 (1984) (assessing 
the case for tying Medicare coinsurance rates to beneficiary income). 
73 See, e.g., William M. Sage, The Role of Medicare in Medical Malpractice Reform, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 217 (2006). 
74 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1380-83 (2003) (discussing the current 
extent of privatization of Medicare). 
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Another reason that this experiment does not necessarily signal a new era of experimental 
government is that the legislature, rather than the agency itself, initiated the experimental 
process.75 Although legislative interest in experimentation is promising, a randomized 
experiment initiated by an agency in the absence of an explicit legislative instruction seems more 
likely to move agencies’ culture in an experimental direction. Organic statutes do not generally 
prohibit agency experimentation. Although the statutes governing the SEC, for example, do not 
explicitly provide for the agency to engage in experimentation, they do not prohibit experiments 
either.76 Given its broad regulatory authority,77 the SEC should be able to implement an 
experiment randomized at the firm level. If such an action were challenged, the courts would 
presumably examine it with the usual tools of administrative judicial review, ensuring for 
example that the action was procedurally proper,78 was consistent with law,79 and represented a 
permissible policy judgment.80 
These hurdles should be straightforward for an agency to clear. As long as an agency 
goes through the ordinary notice-and-comment process,81 providing a detailed explanation of the 
purpose of an experiment in the notice of proposed rulemaking,82 as well as a “concise, general 
statement” of basis and purpose,83 there should be no procedural obstacle to proceeding with an 
experiment that would change the law for certain entities. As long as neither the experimental 
                                                 
75 The experimentation did stem from nonrandomized demonstration programs conducted by the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 House Conference Report 
No. 108-391, Nov. 21, 2003, at 2083. But the fact that the agency proceeded with randomized experimentation only after 
legislative authorization shows that agency officials believed either that such authorization was required, or at least that it would 
be prudent to seek such authorization before conducting experiments. 
76 Indeed, the SEC recently engaged in a nonrandomized experiment by temporarily changing rules governing short selling. See 
Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Unveils Measures to Limit Short-Selling, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at C1. Unsurprisingly, given the 
absence of a randomized control group, the experiment’s results are not easy to assess. See Floyd Norris, Did It Help to Curb 
Short Sales?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at C1. 
77 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (giving the SEC power to define “any manipulative or deceptive or contrivance”). 
78 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (setting forth requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
79 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth the modern 
standard for evaluating agency legal interpretations). 
80 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (requiring the reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found 
to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
81 Id. § 553(b) (requiring publication of general notice of proposed rulemaking); id. § 553(c) (requiring opportunity for comment 
and issuance of concise general statement of basis and purpose). 
82 Agencies generally seek to meet the “general notice” requirement by publishing the actual rules that they are considering 
implemented, though even this is sometimes inadequate. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (vacating a rulemaking for failure to release background documents necessary to be able to respond to notice). 
83 “Concise” and “general” are sometimes interpreted to meet “detailed” and “specific.” See Automotive Parts & Accessories 
Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (warning against interpreting these words literally). 
23 
LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION 
 
nor the control legal regimes is inconsistent with the SEC’s governing statute,84 a decision to 
launch an experiment should present no problem for Chevron review.85 Perhaps the most 
significant obstacle would be hard look review,86 in which a court would examine the agency’s 
justification for creating the experiment. But hard look review is supposed to be deferential,87 
and an agency should be able to justify employing a randomized experiment on the ground that 
this approach could provide information relevant to the administrative process. 
Indeed, an administrative agency should perhaps receive broader latitude to create an 
experiment than to create a new administrative regime without an experiment. Procedurally, an 
agency might argue that it should not have to go through notice-and-comment to establish an 
experiment,88 because the experiment is merely designed to produce data from which to make a 
subsequent policy decision. Courts have been hesitant to allow agencies to avoid the notice-and-
comment process for temporary rules,89 perhaps in part because this would allow an 
administrative agency to renew a program indefinitely.90 An agency should, however, at least be 
allowed to focus solely on the reason for conducting an experiment, rather than responding to 
comments on the merits of the underlying policy issue. Because an experiment produces data on 
                                                 
84 Given the vagueness of the statutes governing the SEC, this seems unlikely. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j  (2006) (making it 
unlawful for any person “[t]o use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors”); id. § 78l(giving the Commission authority to require disclosure of information “as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors”). 
85 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
86 See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Its supervisory function calls on the 
court to intervene . . . if the court becomes aware . . . that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, 
and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”); infra notes 95-99 (discussing the seminal Supreme Court hard 
look case). 
87 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“The scope 
of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agence.”). 
88 This might be so when Congress has explicitly instructed an agency to conduct an experiment. Even here, however, the agency 
is generally like to notify the public of its intent to run an experiment, for example by soliciting third parties to perform the 
experiments. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Solicitation for Proposals for the Demonstration Project for Disease Management for 
Severely Chronically Ill Medicare Beneficiaries with Congestive Heart Failure, Diabetes, and Coronary Heart Disease, 67 FED. 
REG. 8267-001, 2002 WL 245888. 
89 The Administrative Procedure Act continues a general exemption for notice-and-comment “when the agency for good cause 
finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest”). 5 U.S.C. § 
553(b)(B). But the courts have found that the temporary nature of a rule is not enough to escape notice-and-comment. See Tenn. 
Gas Pipeline v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
90 But see Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 378 (1989) (suggesting that courts enforce temporary rules only until the 
agency has had enough time to develop a permanent rule, whether or not it has done so). 
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a policy issue, courts should not require an agency to show that existing data already justifies the 
policy that the experiment is designed to test.  
To enact an experimental policy permanently, an agency presumably would face hard 
look review, but here too the courts should perhaps be more deferential than usual. Critics of 
notice-and-comment have complained that it is “ossified,”91 making it too cumbersome to effect 
change. A response to this objection is that demanding review by the courts ensures that an 
agency does not pursue an idiosyncratic, ideological agenda.92 An agency conducting an 
experiment is less likely to be doing so than an agency drawing inferences based on existing data 
that plausibly might support different conclusions. Moreover, courts conducting judicial review 
should recognize the unique value of evidence from randomized experimentation.93 There 
remains a danger that an agency might make invalid inferences on the basis of an experiment. At 
least where experiments provide the best available evidence on a policy issue, however, courts 
should allow an agency to reply that it placed more weight on the experimental evidence, without 
chronicling on a case-by-case basis all of the problems of nonexperimental evidence. 
If courts did accord data from random experiments more weight than policy speculation 
or other data, agencies might engage in experimentation to constrain judges who will review the 
new policy. Agencies, after all, are not the only possible source of ideological influence in 
administrative law; studies repeatedly show that political variables help explain judges’ decisions 
in performing judicial review of administrative action.94 If a random experiment provides 
evidence that a policy advances some important objective, then it will be more difficult for 
judges to vacate a rulemaking implementing the new policy on judicial review. Judges do not 
generally second-guess an agency’s priorities, but do scrutinize empirical evidence. 
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,95 in which the Court 
                                                 
91 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). 
92 An ideological agency, facing an ideologically hostile court, might respond either by investing more in meeting the 
requirements of the hard look doctrine or “allocate their resources to other projects.” Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1770 (1997). 
93 Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 1, at 397 (arguing that hard look review should reward experimental agency approaches, though 
not focusing specifically on random experimentation). 
94 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Analysis of Chevron, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006) (offering a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court and circuit court review of agency legal 
conclusions). 
95 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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struck down the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s cancellation of a standard 
requiring installation of either air bags or passive seat belts in cars.96 Part of the Court’s concern 
was that the agency could not substantiate its claim that the requirement had led to at least a five 
percent increase in seat belt use.97 Suppose, however, that the agency had run a randomized 
experiment assessing the effectiveness of such a system.98 Then the agency would have had 
relatively incontrovertible data about the increase in seat belt use. To overturn the agency’s 
decision on this ground,99 the Court would have had to question the agency’s normative 
judgment about the value of whatever level of increased seat belt use was demonstrated. But, 
under current understandings of the hard look doctrine stemming from the Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers decision, courts applying the hard look doctrine do not substitute their value 
choices for an agency’s. 
When an agency adopts a self-executing experiment, a court reviewing the policy should 
assess it from an ex ante rather than an ex post perspective.100 It may have been sensible for an 
agency to specify that policy will depend on a simple numerical comparison of the results of an 
experiment even if statistical arguments based on the experimental data could support both 
positions. This presents a tradeoff between information and objectivity. Even if hypothetical 
neutral observers could come closer to making sound empirical judgments by second-guessing 
experimental results, allowing judges the power to do so entails the risk that the judges may 
strike down agency policies based on their own normative preferences. Where an agency 
reasonably commits itself to a self-executing experiment, especially if opponents of a policy do 
not generally complain at the time an experiment is initially designed, a court should assess that 
                                                 
96 Id. at 34. 
97 Id. at 53-54. 
98 For example, the agency might have required automobile manufacturers to install passive seat belts in a randomly selected 
proportion of cars ordered by consumers direct from the factory, and then tracked accident data for these cars. This research 
design is not without its problems; some consumers might dislike the passive belts and return the cars for alternatives. But part of 
the agency’s concern was that consumers might disable the passive seatbelt function. Id. at 54.. Thus, an “intent to treat” 
estimate, see infra note 221 and accompanying text, should at least approximately capture the effect of offering the feature by 
default at no extra charge. 
99 The Court had an alternative basis for overturning the agency’s decision, that the agency did not consider requiring air bags. 
Id. at 48-50. Of course, the agency also might have run a randomized study of the effectiveness of air bags. 
100 Admittedly, it may not be easy for judges to overcome hindsight bias. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory 
of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 588-94 (1998).  Courts might, however, consider challenges to a self-executing 
experiment before the experiment is complete. 
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decision on the basis of the information then available,101 not on the basis of information that 
becomes available after the decision is made. 
Administrative law doctrine, in short, can support an experimental culture by placing 
great weight on the results of randomized experiments in performing judicial review, and by 
supporting efforts of agencies to generate support among opponents for experiments that would 
resolve their differences. A more aggressive use of administrative law in favor of 
experimentation would be for courts to strike down policies on the basis that an administrative 
agency failed to conduct a randomized experiment, when such an experiment would have 
resolved key empirical questions. This would require no great doctrinal innovation, as courts 
already sometimes fault agencies for failing to gather relevant data.102 It seems unlikely that 
courts will insist on experimentation until experimentation becomes commonplace, but 
ultimately such insistence can be justified on the ground that agencies ought to use the 
policymaking tools that best resolve the policy issues facing them. 
3. Courts 
The third branch of government is generally least suited to initiate randomized 
experiments. Judges decide individual cases, at least theoretically resolving broader legal issues 
only to the extent necessary to resolve the cases before them. Perhaps the traditional view that 
“flipping a coin” is the antithesis of judging could be relaxed when randomization is for the 
purpose of conducting an experiment.103 But an individual judge cannot typically initiate a 
randomized experiment anyway, because a judge will not preside over a sufficiently large 
number of cases to make any randomization meaningful. Nonetheless, with legislative  
authorization, or with delegation to a quasi-judicial body,104 experiments could randomize 
different cases to different treatments.105 For example, the literature on fee shifting focuses on 
                                                 
101 Courts conversely may uphold an agency’s decision only on the basis of grounds that the agency in fact relied upon. See SEC 
v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the 
record discloses that its action was based.”). 
102 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
103 See, e.g., Richard K. Greenstein, Why the Rule of Law?, 66 LA. L. REV. 63, 89-90 (2005) (discussing the problems of making 
decisions by flipping coins). 
104 See Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 , 
1204 (2002) (suggesting that the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States conduct experiments). 
105 Laurens Walker has argued for the use of field experiments to test and improve the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Walker, supra note 5. 
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laboratory experiments106 and nonexperimental statistical analyses.107 A randomized experiment 
could potentially resolve the theoretical controversy over whether fee shifting would increase or 
reduce litigation costs,108 though it could be harder to measure effects of fee shifting on variables 
such as adjudication accuracy.109 Individual jurisdictions sometimes innovate in case 
management and processing,110 and randomized experiments could help assess these 
innovations.111  
C. Alternative and Related Approaches 
Experimentation is not the exclusive means by which legislatures can improve 
information, make enactments of reform more likely, and enhance transparency. This section 
considers a variety of other available techniques—sunset clauses, reporting requirements, 
delegation, and privatization—and assesses their advantages and disadvantages relative to 
experimentation, as well as how these techniques can be used in conjunction with randomized 
self-executing experiments. 
1. Sunset Clauses 
Sunset clauses are legislative provisions that cause legislative programs to expire, unless 
the legislature acts to renew those programs.112 Sunset clauses can provide some of the same 
                                                 
106 See Laura Inglis et al., Experiments on the Effects of Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of 
Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 90 (2005). 
107 See, e.g., Jackson Williams, Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting Laws on Claiming Behavior, 34 POL’Y SCIENCES 347, 354 (2001) 
(finding that fee shifting rules increase the incidence of litigation, but noting that endogeneity could drive the result). 
108 See generally Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for Allocation of 
Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 69 (1982) (showing that such effects depend in part on empirical factors such as whether 
plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing are generally low or high). 
109 See Keith Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (“Not a shred of 
empirical evidence on the compliance effects of alternative fee shifting rules exists, however, and it is unlikely that it ever will, 
given the cost of the required experiments.”).  
110 See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of Judicial Reform and the California Courts, 
1960-1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2049, 2065 (1993) (discussing procedural innovation by state and federal district courts in 
California). 
111 An example of nonrandomized experiments that are difficult to analyze is the advent of “drug courts.” See Morris B. 
Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1438, 1479-80 (2000) (noting the difficulties of interpreting nonrandomized 
experiments on drug courts); cf. Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, The Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court: One-Year 
Results From a Randomized Study, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 337, 341 (2002) (providing a randomized study of a drug court 
and noting that the many previous studies were nonrandomized). 
112 Jacob Gersen defines sunset clauses as a subset of a broader class of “temporary legislation,” with sunset clauses specifically 
focused on programs run by administrative agencies. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 260 
(2007) (noting that sunset legislation has “sought to increase legislative oversight, bureaucratic responsiveness, and regulatory 
efficiency”). Here, I use the “sunset clauses” phrase synonymously with “temporary legislation.” 
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benefits as random experimentation. Sunset clauses test particular legal reforms, providing the 
legislature additional information when it considers renewing the program.113 Legislation can 
always be changed by legislatures, but sunset clauses increase the probability of later legislative 
scrutiny, making it more likely that the legislature will consider information produced by the 
experiment. Sunset clauses also can be easier to enact, because marginal legislators may be 
reassured that they will have an opportunity to revisit the issues later with better information.114 
Finally, by forcing legislators periodically to reexamine issues, they make it more difficult for 
legislators to escape accountability by inaction, thus increasing goal transparency. 
There are, however, significant differences between the approaches. Some of these 
considerations favor self-executed randomized experiments. Where feasible, randomized 
experiments may produce more reliable information.115 Self-execution ensures that the 
legislature will take the results of the experiment into account. In addition, self-execution 
requires legislators to set goals explicitly, while agreement to a sunset clause represents a loose 
commitment to revisiting an issue. Meanwhile, self-execution saves legislators the time that a 
sunset clause would require to re-enact a statute.116 Other considerations, however, may favor 
sunset clauses. If empirical uncertainty exists about whether a program will be politically 
acceptable, a sunset clause may be effective.117 It might be difficult to conceive of an experiment 
that could compare public reaction to the treatment and control regimes. Meanwhile, if 
legislators believe that it will be particularly important for public attention to be drawn again to 
an issue, the sunsetting of the law might provoke more public attention than self-execution of an 
experiment. 
Randomization can easily be used in conjunction with a sunset clause. Consider, for 
example, a current proposal that would sometimes channel patent cases to judges with more 
                                                 
113 See id. at 274 (“Experimental temporary legislation tends to implement policy on a short-term basis as a means of generating 
information that can be subsequently incorporated into the policymaking process.”). 
114 Id. at 264 (“[T]emporary legislation’s initial enactment costs are almost certainly less than permanent legislation’s.”). 
115 See infra Part III.A. 
116 Gersen notes that whether sunset clauses save legislative time overall is ambiguous. See Gersen, supra note 112, at 263-66. 
He notes, though, that especially for legislation of relatively short duration (such as three years), sunset clauses are likely to be 
more demanding on legislative time. Id. at 264. Conceivably, an agreement to a self-executing experiment might increase or 
decrease legislative time relative to permanent legislation. On one hand, legislators will need to define (or delegate the task of 
deciding) how the experiment will operate, but on the other, a self-executing experiment may allow legislators an escape from the 
necessity of resolving their disagreements through negotiation. 
117 Sometimes, however, even politically controversial provisions are extended. See, e.g., Heather Hillary & Nancy Kubasek, The 
Remaining Perils of the Patriot Act: A Primer, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 1, 26 (2007) (noting the extension of controversial sunsetting 
provisions of the USA Patriot Act). 
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patent experience.118 Congress could provide for a randomized experiment of this proposal over 
a limited time,119 and could specify a simple metric for assessing the success of the 
experiment.120 Merely by virtue of advance specification, this metric would presumably receive 
attention at the time reauthorization is considered. A self-executing experiment that provides for 
the legal regime to be continued and extended only given some metric of success in effect 
sunsets the legislation in the absence of success.  
                                                
2. Reporting Requirements 
Another tool that increases the chance of reconsideration is a requirement that a report 
evaluating a program be prepared, either by the implementing agency or an independent agency, 
such as the Government Accounting Office.121 The report might set forth specific 
recommendations about how the law should be changed. Such a reporting requirement can 
increase information available to legislators, in much the same way as an experiment, and the 
expectation of such new information might mollify wavering legislators. In addition, such a 
requirement can promote transparency; legislators may be hesitant to approve legislation that a 
later report is likely to pillory. 
These effects seem likely to be considerably weaker than self-executing randomized 
experiments’. Many governmental reports receive little public notice,122 and like experiments 
that are not self-executing, may not influence legislators at all. A report may have some 
advantages over a self-executing experiment, however. It can consider all aspects of experience 
with a new legal program, including aspects that either are not susceptible to experimentation, or 
that designers of a self-executing experiment simply might not have anticipated. Once again, a 
hypothetical neutral observer might sometimes prefer a report to the results of a simplified 
 
118See H.R. 34 (110th Cong. 2007). For an empirical analysis, see David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical 
Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
119 Under the proposal, judges who do not opt in to being specialized patent judges are permitted to refuse patent cases, in which 
case they are reassigned to judges who have opted in. H.R. 34 § 1(a)(1)(C)-(D). A randomization could provide that a decision to 
opt out would only have a 50% chance of being granted.  
120 For example, Congress could compare reversal rates in cases in which the proposal applied to reversal rates in cases in which 
the proposal did not apply.  
121 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 804(d), 113 Stat. 512, 704 (1999) (requiring the GAO to issue a report one year following the 
enactment of certain regulations). 
122 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Robinson, Legal Systems, Decisionmaking, and the Science of Earth’s Systems: Procedural Missing 
Links, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1077, 1105 (2005) (noting that even national environmental reports required to be filed with the United 
Nations are largely ignored). 
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randomized experiment, but the simplification inherent in an experiment and in self-execution 
may increase the chance that information has an effect on the policy process. 
A special case of a reporting requirement is the creation of a “blue-ribbon” panel, 
typically consisting of an illustrious bipartisan group. In recent years, such commissions have 
addressed issues such as preventing further terrorist attacks,123 the failure of intelligence on 
whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction,124 the further conduct of the war in Iraq,125 
voter identification requirements,126 and income tax reform.127 To the extent that such panels can 
reach consensus, the public receives assurance that its recommendations are apolitical.128 Such 
reports may produce information, increase the chance that reform is enacted,129 and expose 
legislative positions in tension with available evidence. Both experiments and blue-ribbon panels 
are means by which a legislature, unable to agree itself on issues, can provide a relatively 
objective type of test of a policy issue. Which is preferable may depend on the amenability of the 
issue to experimentation and on the chance that the panel will successfully influence the policy 
process. 
3. Delegation to Independent Agencies 
A blue ribbon panel can be conceived as roughly equivalent to an independent agency, 
but with power only to make recommendations.130 Like a self-executing experiment, an 
independent agency is a mechanism for gathering information and changing the law without 
                                                 
123 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf. 
124 See COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (2005), http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf.  
125 See THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT: THE WAY FORWARD – A NEW APPROACH (2007), available at 
http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html.  
126 See COMM’N ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2005), available at 
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf. 
127 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, FINAL REPORT (2005), available at 
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/. 
128 That does not mean that recommendations are always unanimous and uncontroversial. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Carter 
Baker Dissent, http://www.carterbakerdissent.com/ (offering a dissenting statement by a member of the Carter-Baker 
Commission, which the Commission as a whole did not allow to be included in full in the report). 
129 This will be so, however, only if it is easier for commission members to bargain than for members of the legislature to do so. 
One reason that such bargaining might be more feasible is that commission members may be relatively free of the need to 
appease special interests, possibly reducing disagreement on some issues. 
130 Critics of delegation sometimes point out that in the absence of delegated power, independent agencies would still be able to 
use their expertise to develop proposals that they would then forward to the legislative branch. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, 
Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 
239, 308-11 (2005) (arguing for a system in which Congress would be required to ratify certain agency decisions). 
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legislative intervention. Sometimes, delegation facilitates reform by allowing enactment of laws 
even where lawmakers cannot agree about some details. Common critiques of delegation, 
however, show advantages of self-executing random experimentation. First, delegation may be a 
vehicle by which legislators avoid accountability, reducing goal transparency by allowing 
legislators to make vague normative commitments.131 With self-executing randomized 
experiments, legislators must specify the criteria that reflect whether new legislation is enacted. 
Second, even nominally independent agencies may reflect the political preferences and biases of 
the administrations that appoint their officials. By creating a randomized experiment and criteria 
for self-execution, a legislature, even one that relies on an agency to implement and measure the 
experiment, limits the degree to which the normative preferences of the executive branch will 
affect the law.  
4. Privatization 
Privatization is a form of delegation, and it is thus subject to some of the same critiques 
as delegation,132 particularly that it may reduce legislative accountability.133 Yet one approach to 
privatization, in which private actors are given high-powered financial incentives,134 can enhance 
accountability. Suppose, for example, that the government privatizes a prison by defining a 
formula that promises to pay an operator based on some formula involving observable criteria, 
such as recidivism, escapes, inmate health, and so on, where the coefficients attached to each 
variable represent the approximate social benefits of improvements with regard to that 
consideration.135 The government might then auction the right to operate the prison to the private 
operator willing to pay the most to receive the rewards of the formula. 
                                                 
131 See generally George I. Lovell, That Sick Chicken Won’t Hunt: The Limits of a Judicially Enforced Non-Delegation Doctrine, 
17 CONST. COMMENTARY 79, 80-81 (2000) (assessing whether a strong nondelegation doctrine would promote accountability). 
132 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1394-1400 (2003) (exploring parallels 
between delegation and privatization). Privatization may have some advantages relative to delegation, such as that private actors 
may be more efficient than public actors, as well as some costs, such as that private actors may be more prone to act in their own 
interest rather than in the public interest.  
133 Id. at 1470-80. 
134 High-powered incentives tend to work best when it is feasible to monitor performance. See Howard Frant, High-Powered and 
Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector, 6 J. PUB. ADM. RESEARCH & THEORY 365, 366-72 (1996) (applying this insight in 
private- and public-sector contexts). 
135 See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Effectiveness of Monitoring Agencies (Georgetown Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 982146, April 2007), available at http://works.bepress.com/alexander_volokh/5 (discussing monitoring in 
the prison privatization context). 
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There may be grounds for opposing such an approach, particularly if what is delegated, as 
some commentators have suggested,136 is the capacity to engage in lawmaking. Nonetheless, it 
could help improve goal transparency in much the same way as random experimentation, by 
requiring explicit specification of social welfare criteria. Meanwhile, the private organization 
itself would have robust incentives to develop new information to improve its processes. The 
difference between the two approaches is that with government-initiated random 
experimentation, policymakers specify criteria and the legal consequences of success, while with 
privatization, policymakers specify criteria but allow the private entity to determine how, within 
any applicable legal constraints, to optimize given those criteria. Privatization may thus increase 
the chance that legal structures will be adjusted to incorporate information from experimentation 
and elsewhere, but at the hazard of less public control.  
III. ADVANTAGES AND TECHNICAL LIMITS OF RANDOMIZATION 
This Part explores the advantages and limits of randomized studies. This analysis 
responds to two arguments. The first is that randomized studies are unnecessary, because 
statistical and econometric techniques can be used to estimate policy effects reliably. Part III.A 
argues that even when the most advanced techniques are employed, nonrandom analyses will 
generally leave more uncertainty than random analyses. Regression analyses will often leave 
sufficient ambiguity that both proponents and opponents of a particular policy can credibly 
disagree about whether a particular study should influence public debate. Not only are 
randomized studies often better than corresponding nonrandomized studies, but more 
importantly, the policy context magnifies the difference. 
The second argument is that even if randomized studies are better than nonrandomized 
ones, policymakers can disagree about their relevance to policy questions. Part III.B agrees but 
argues that this problem strengthens the case for self-executing randomized studies. A 
nonrandomized study can be self-executing, with policymakers agreeing in advance on 
regression designs and a formula aggregating regression coefficients or other results. But it is 
difficult to conceive in advance of all the regression tests that would be necessary to verify 
robustness. Any formula is likely to be somewhat arbitrary and difficult to understand. 
                                                 
136 See Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE L.J. 167 (1985) (describing how 
enforcement of public policy can be privatized). 
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Nonrandomized statistical analyses are sufficiently unreliable that they are unlikely to influence 
the policy process ex post, and sufficiently opaque that they cannot serve as the basis for self-
execution. Randomized statistical analyses are still somewhat unreliable as policy bases, but 
sufficiently good that relying on them would tend to improve policy, and transparent enough to 
serve as a basis for self-execution. Even if social scientists might feel more comfortable 
scrutinizing many nonrandom experiments than blindly following an ex ante specification of a 
measurement to be taken from a random experiment, randomized self-executing experiments 
may be the better political tool. 
A. Problems with Nonrandom Evaluation 
Any statutory change is experimental in that it creates a new legal regime, allowing 
comparison to the world in the prior regime. Indeed, it is common for proponents and neutral 
commentators to describe such a change as “an experiment.”137 Effects, however, can be difficult 
to assess, because there may be alternative explanations for any observed changes. Some legal 
changes are sufficiently drastic, and the responses to them sufficiently immediate and profound, 
that some changes may be attributed to them. But reasonable observers often disagree about 
causality. And even if reasonable sophisticated parties would agree, partisans may offer 
misleading interpretations of the data. The media may then summarize the debate by simply 
noting that experts disagree.138 Those who do not have the time, inclination, or ability to probe 
the evidence cannot then easily discern the truth.139  
As the number of jurisdictions trying an experiment rises, the data may become clearer. 
But even then, the challenges of statistical analysis may make it difficult to reach confident 
conclusions. Statistical associations between jurisdictions adopting policies and other variables 
need not imply causation. It will thus almost always be relatively easy for partisans to find some 
basis on which either to develop misleading results or to offer critiques of results that in fact are 
relatively robust. Part III.A.1 explains why even with numerous jurisdictions, conventional 
multiple regression analysis in which the policy of interest forms an independent variable may 
                                                 
137 See supra note 1. 
138 See Bryan Keefer, Tsunami, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July 1, 2004, at 18 (discussing reporters’ reluctance to take sides on 
issues of public controversy). 
139 A similar problem exists when jurors try to assess evidence beyond their competence. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert 
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998). 
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produce inaccurate results, while Part III.A.2 argues that pseudo-random experimentation 
techniques do not resolve the problem. These sections, of course, are not intended to provide 
comprehensive overviews of the uses and limits of statistical analysis.140 Part III.A.3 comments 
on the difficulties of improving the law by using the states as policy laboratories. 
1. Conventional Regression Analysis 
a. Omitted variable bias 
Correlation, introductory statistics students are told, does not imply causation. The 
simplest example of this is the possibility of reverse causation. For example, suppose that 
students who receive sex education have sex at an earlier age.141 This could mean that sex 
education encourages students to have more sex, but it also could reflect that school districts with 
high rates of student sexual activity respond to these rates by offering sex education. A standard 
statistical approach to overcoming this problem is to add control variables for the characteristics 
of the students, such as family income, parents’ education, and religion, as well as of the 
community, such as whether it is rural and in which region of the country it is located.142 If those 
variables exhaust all nonrandom factors contributing to community and family decisions about 
sex education, then this technique will be successful, because the coefficient on the sex education 
variable then represents the effect of random variation in whether students are exposed to sex 
education. But if there is an omitted variable, correlated with both the community decision to 
offer sex education and the individual decision to have sex, the coefficient will be biased. 
This problem cannot easily be avoided even by careful researchers (and can be exploited 
by researchers who hope to establish a particular result). There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, the available data may be incomplete. Even if there are strong theoretical reasons to believe 
that parental education is an important variable, it may be impossible to develop a measure that 
fully accounts for the parent’s educational level.143 For example, a measure indicating whether 
someone’s mother graduated from high school would seem to imply that all high school dropouts 
                                                 
140 A useful overview of regression analysis is WILLIAM MENDENHALL & TERRY L. SINCICH, A SECOND COURSE IN STATISTICS: 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (6th ed. 2003). For a critical analysis of the use of empirical evidence in legal scholarship, see Lee 
Epstein, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
141 See, e.g., Deborah Anne Dawson, The Effects of Sex Education on Adolescent Behavior, 18 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 162 
(July/August 1986)  
142 See, e.g., id. at 170 tbl. 9 (listing control variables). 
143 Dawson’s study used a binary variable indicating whether the mother had at least twelve years of education. See id. at 166. 
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are alike and all high school graduates are alike, but within each group, there may be 
considerable educational heterogeneity. Even more precise data—including information like 
parental GPAs—will be at best only crude proxies. Second, the researchers’ theoretical accounts 
of what variables may correlate with the dependent and independent variables are likely to be 
incomplete.  
The omitted variable bias may be particularly problematic when regressions are used to 
analyze the behavior of individuals who have self-selected into particular governmental 
programs. For example, Julie Cullen et al. analyzed the effect of school choice lotteries, whose 
winners would be allowed to attend particular schools.144 Students who won the school choice 
lotteries tended to do better than students who did not enter the lotteries. Competing explanations 
include that lottery winners were allowed to attend better schools and that more motivated 
students are likely to self-select into the lottery. In the absence of variables fully capturing 
student motivation, a regression would tend to inflate the apparent effects of the schools on 
performance. Indeed, Cullen et al. showed that students who won the school choice lotteries 
performed no better than students who entered but lost the same lotteries. Though not created for 
the purpose of facilitating data analysis, the lottery produced random assignments that allowed 
the researchers to avoid omitted variable bias. 
Even studies that attempt to control for all available information and seek to minimize the 
danger of omitted variable bias may nonetheless omit important variables. This can be shown by 
comparing the results of randomized experiments from the results of nonrandomized statistical 
analysis. Paul Glewwe et al. conducted separate prospective randomized and retrospective 
nonrandomized studies of whether making “flip charts” available to students in Kenya increased 
test scores. The retrospective studies showed that flip charts increased test scores, while the 
randomized studies revealed no effect.145 Even a difference-in-difference analysis gave 
misleading results, showing that students in schools adopting flip charts performed especially 
well in flip chart subjects relative to other subjects. The forces that lead jurisdictions or 
                                                 
144 See, e.g., Julie Berry Cullen et al., The Effect of School Choice on Student Outcomes: Evidence from Randomized Lotteries 
(NBER Working Paper No. 10113, 2003). 
145 Paul Glewwe et al., Retrospective vs. Prospective Analyses of School Inputs: The Case of Flip Charts in Kenya (NBER 
Working Paper No. 8018, 2000). 
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institutions to adopt policy changes such as flip charts may be so complex that omitted variables 
matter even when it is not obvious that any important variables are omitted. 
Other studies have also shown different results with randomized and nonrandomized 
studies.146 This does not mean that retrospective statistical analysis is worthless. A rational 
Bayesian policymaker would update priors about likely effects of policy choices based on the 
regression results.147 The degree to which priors change should depend, among other factors, on 
the magnitude of the effects demonstrated and on the relevance and possible implications of 
variables omitted from study. With large numbers of studies over time pointing largely in one 
direction, it may sometimes be possible for the policy community to develop a consensus on 
what were once controversial empirical questions.148 But there is no single objective metric for 
assessing the quality of a particular study, including considerations such as how important 
omitted variables are or in what direction they would likely bias coefficients.  
b. Publication bias and misspecification 
Statistically significant results can also be spurious as a result of publication bias. A 
finding of a statistically significant outcome, at the generally accepted 0.05 level, means that 
there is a five percent chance that an outcome at least as extreme would have occurred by pure 
                                                 
146 For example, a study by Steven Glazerman et al. evaluated the impact of job training or employment services program on 
future income, and compared their results with earlier, nonrandomized studies. See Steven Glazerman et al., Nonexperimental 
Versus Experimental Estimates of Earnings Impacts, 589 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 63 (2003). They were able to 
identify a variable (prior earnings) that some earlier studies had omitted, and these studies had biased estimates of about $1,600 
relative to their randomized results. See id. at 79. Even studies that included this variable, however, had a bias of about $1,000, 
see id., again apparently demonstrating that even unknown omitted variables may be quite important.  
 Another study in which randomized results seemed to contradict earlier nonrandomized analyses focused on 
agricultural technology adoption. See Esther Duflo et al., Understanding Technology Adoption: Fertilizer in Western Kenya: 
Preliminary Results from Field Experiments (2006), http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/saez/e231_s06/esther.pdf. 
Earlier studies showed that when farmers’ contacts used fertilizer, the farmers were more likely to use it themselves. This 
supported the view that technological innovations could spread through social networks, thus making more plausible the case for 
government to seek to introduce agricultural technology in the hope that farmers will spread it among themselves. In the 
randomized study, a group of farmers were asked to list their contacts, and some of the farmers were randomly selected to receive 
fertilizer. These farmers’ contacts were no more likely to use fertilizer than the contacts of those who did not receive it.  Thus, in 
the nonrandomized study, there was presumably some unidentified variable that affected both whether farmers and their contacts 
used fertilizer, leading to the spurious conclusion that the contacts led to technology diffusion. See also Charles Manski, 
Identification of Exogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem, 60 REV. ECON. STUDS. 531 (1993) (labeling this the 
“reflection problem” in studies seeking to identify sociological effects among neighbors). 
147 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
148 That does not necessarily mean that meta-analyses of numerous studies can be trusted to produce reliable results, because 
many studies on the same issue can suffer from similar biases. Mark Lipsey and David Wilson found that substantial bias relative 
to the results of nonrandomized studies may still exist in individual meta-analyses of particular experimental interventions. See 
Mark W. Lipsey & David B. Wilson, The Efficacy of Psychological, Educational, and Behavioral Treatment: Confirmation from 
Meta-Analysis, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 1181, 1193 (1993) (“In some treatment areas, therefore, nonrandom designs (relative to 
random) tend to strongly underestimate effects, and in others, they tend to strongly overestimate effects.”). 
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chance if the null hypothesis were true.149 If, for example, researchers test 100 propositions that 
in fact are all false and would be counterintuitive if true, about five of these tests may produce 
statistically significant results, and these mistaken results will be the most publishable.150 
Meanwhile, insignificant findings provide little support for the truth of the corresponding null 
hypotheses. Such findings also may be most publishable when they are counterintuitive, but a 
counterintuitive failure to reject a null hypothesis may also be the result of chance.151 
Publication bias applies not only across studies, but also within studies. Researchers face 
many choices about how to specify regression equations: what functional form to use,152 which 
variables to include, what transformations to apply to the variables,153 and which observations to 
include.154 Especially within social science, researchers do not necessarily settle on regression 
specifications in advance, but instead “pretest” data to determine which results to report.155 
Considering a large number of regression specifications may help researchers develop nuanced 
accounts, but researchers will generally be more likely to report results producing statistical 
significance.156 Laboratory experiments are also subject to publication bias, but other researchers 
can attempt replication. Social science researchers cannot rerun history.157 
Social scientists can, however, seek to assess the robustness of published results. A recent 
example was John Donohue and Justin Wolfers’ scrutiny of studies purporting to show deterrent 
                                                 
149 An example of a “null hypothesis” would be that in the true relationship being estimated by a regression equation, the 
coefficient for one of the independent variables in fact is zero, indicating that, after controlling for other variables, there is no 
relationship between the dependent variable and that independent variable. 
150 Some researchers have sought to counter this by encouraging the publication of statistically insignificant results. See, e.g., 
Huai Yong Cheng, The Potential Value of Negative Studies, 6 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N 426 (2005). 
151 See J. Bradford De Long & Kevin Lang, Are All Economic Hypotheses False?, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1257 (1992) (conducting a 
statistical analysis of the distribution of statistical results to estimate the proportion of unrejected null nypotheses that are false). 
The De Long and Lang statistical analysis rejects “the null hypothesis that more than about one-third of unrejected null 
hypotheses … are true.” Id. at 1258. That is, among published findings that do not show statistically significant outcomes  
152 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 316-50 (3d ed. 1998) (providing an introduction to these issues). 
153 See id. (considering the possibility of nonlinear specifications). 
154 There may be flexibility both in determining the general coverage of the study (for example, what years or states to study), as 
well as in identifying outliers. Typically, when an observation is identified as an outlier, a researcher will run a regression both 
with and without the outliers to determine whether the results are robust. There are also econometric techniques designed to 
produce estimates not overly susceptible to outliers. See, e.g., PETER J. ROUSSEEUW & ANNICK M. LEROY (2003). Some 
researchers, however, may not use these techniques. 
155 T. Dudley Wallace, Pretest Estimation in Regression: A Survey, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 431, 431 (1977) (“Given the nature 
of economic data, pretesting has been and probably will continue to be widely used in spite of sharp criticism.”). 
156 The traditional t statistic will be inaccurate when researchers test numerous regression specifications and then focus only on 
those whose t statistics appear to produce statistically significant results. See, e.g., Dmitry Danilov & Jan R. Magnus, Forecast 
Accuracy with Pretesting with an Application to the Stock Market, 23 J. FORECASTING 251 (2004). 
157 See Jeff Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian?, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 197 (2007) (noting that in law, “the 
researcher is dealing with observational data that cannot be extended by additional experimentation”). 
38 
LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION 
 
effects of the death penalty.158 For example, they criticized a study by Hashem Dezhbakhsh and 
Joanna Shepherd,159 focusing first on a cross-sectional analysis of homicide trends in states that 
either abolished or adopted the death penalty. Dohonue and Wolfers argue that the same general 
trends existed in states that had not changed death penalty policy, and reanalyzed the data with a 
difference-in-differences approach. This produced statistically insignificant results.160 Similarly, 
Donohue and Wolfers modify a regression performed by Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd by including 
year fixed effect rather than decade fixed effect variables,161 and making the critical coefficient 
statistically insignificant. Donohue and Wolfers take similar approaches in questioning several 
other papers’ results.162 Their point is not that prior commentators necessarily made poor 
choices, but that the particular reported results are not adequately supported.163 
                                                
Often, there will be some subjectivity involved in determining whether a study’s results 
are sufficiently robust to justify causal inferences. This does not mean that every empirical 
question will yield an uncertain answer. But the death penalty is hardly the only debate about 
which scholarly experts have hotly contested empirical outcomes. Other recent examples in the 
criminological context include debates about whether abortion legalization is responsible for the 
decrease in the crime rate,164 and whether statutes allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns 
lower violent crime rates.165 Whatever the merits, academics and policymakers have not reached 
consensus on these questions. Even if the median voter or median decisionmaker would be 
swayed by empirical results, it will not be easy to determine what to believe. 
 
158 See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 791 (2005). 
159 See Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Evidence from a Judicial 
Experiment (Emory Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-04, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=432621. 
160 Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 158, at 800-04. 
161 A year fixed effect variable is simply a binary variable corresponding to each year (except one), with a 1 indicating that an 
observation was from that year and a 0 indicating that an observation was not from that year. See, e.g., PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE 
TO ECONOMETRICS 311-15 (5th ed. 2003) (providing an introduction to fixed effects variables). Decade fixed effects do the same 
for decades. 
162 See, e.g., Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 158, at 811 (showing that the findings of Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, 
Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003), were sensitive to the choice of an applicable time 
period); id. at 816-18 (finding that H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453 (2003), results were sensitive to the choice of the length of a time 
lag). 
163 See id. at 836 (stating that “we do not believe that economic or econometric theory are sufficiently well developed” to justify 
“a particularly strong prior belief about the ‘correct specification’”). 
164 The paper that started the debate is John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 
Q.J. ECON. 379 (2001). 
165 At the center of this debate is the book JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (1998). 
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Publication bias is a danger in randomized studies too.166 But there is less room for 
identifying alternative empirical specifications given the centrality of the random variable. As 
Esther Duflo has noted, in retrospective studies, “[e]x post the researchers or evaluators define 
their own comparison group, and thus may be able to pick a variety of plausible comparison 
groups,”167 but in a randomized study, the treatment and comparison groups will generally be 
clearly defined. There is still some danger that researchers will decide not to publish, but that 
danger is considerably reduced when governmental institutions have sponsored the research by 
supporting the randomization of policy and a particular set of researchers has promised to 
analyze the effects of the experiment. Indeed, governments can virtually eliminate the risk by 
requiring publication of experimental results as a condition of funding. 
2. Pseudorandom Experimentation 
Concerns about retrospective analyses have led econometricians to use techniques that 
allow clearer identification of the effects of policy decisions. Although these techniques can help 
determine whether an association between a policy change and some other phenomenon is 
causal, there is still sufficient subjectivity in the execution of these studies that such analysis will 
only rarely leave statisticians, let alone policymakers, in unanimous agreement. Even with, or 
perhaps especially with, the most sophisticated tools, statistical analysis requires expert 
judgments about the quality of any particular study. Although there can also be considerable 
debate about the quality of randomized studies, randomization at least solves the central issues 
that techniques such as instrumental variable estimation and regression discontinuity design 
address. 
a. Instrumental variables studies 
Instrumental variables techniques substitute for an explanatory variable a prediction of 
that variable based on one or more additional variables, the instruments. Each instrument must be 
correlated with the explanatory variable, but not correlated with the independent variable except 
                                                 
166 Selective publication of results has been most clearly demonstrated in the medical arena, though the studies do not assess 
whether selective publication is a result of self-censorship by authors (perhaps because they do not want to suggest that a drug 
was ineffective) or by journals. See, e.g., Eric H. Turner, M.D. et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its 
Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252 (Jan. 17, 2008) (analyzing which reviews of antidepressant agents 
submitted to the FDA were subsequently published). 
167 Esther Duflo, Scaling Up and Evaluation, 2004 ANN. WORLD BANK CONF. ON DEVEL. ECON. 341, 353. 
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through the correlation with the explanatory variable.168 Consider, for example, Steven Levitt’s 
attempt to determine the effect of police presence on crime.169 A regression simply using the 
change in the crime rate as a dependent variable and police presence as an independent variable 
would produce a biased coefficient, because the choice of how many police to hire is endogenous 
and may depend in part on expectations of whether crime is likely to increase. Levitt developed a 
regression predicting the change in the number of police officers based on factors including 
whether a mayoral election was scheduled,170 and then substituted the predicted values from this 
regression for the variable directly measuring police presence. Using the predicted change in 
police presence as an explanatory variable rather than the actual change in police presence allows 
the experimenters to isolate the effect of increased police presence attributable to what amounts 
to a random factor, the election year calendar. 
Instrumental variables studies will not always be adequate substitutes for truly 
randomized studies, however.171 There may be some subjectivity in the choice of instruments.172 
Donohue and Wolfers, for example, criticized death penalty studies that used instrumental 
variables techniques.173 They argue that in the Dezhbakhsh et al. study, the instruments for 
executions affect the independent variable (homicide rates) directly. Donohue and Wolfers 
establish this in part by showing that the relationship exists even in the states that have never had 
the death penalty,174 and also by showing that the variables are correlated with rates of crimes for 
which the death penalty does not even apply.175 Although there are statistical tests that can be 
                                                 
168 That is, the instrument must not be correlated with the error term in the regression equation using the original explanatory 
variable. See generally Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From 
Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (2001). 
169 Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270 
(1997). 
170 Id. at 277. 
171 The Levitt study encountered an unusual criticism, that Levitt had made a programming error that made his estimates seem 
more precise than they in fact were. Justin McCrary, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on 
Crime: Comment, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1236 (2002) (pointing out the error in Levitt’s calculations). 
172 In the context of estimating the effect of increased police presence on crime rates, later researchers have suggested other 
instruments. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, Using Terror Alert Levels to Estimate the Effect of Police on 
Crime, 48 J.L. & ECON. 267 (2005) (using terror alert levels in Washington, D.C., as an instrument, because the city deployed 
more police when the alert levels were raised, even though the terror alert levels would not be correlated to ordinary crime rates). 
If multiple studies produce consistently similar results, then researchers may conclude that the results are robust. But there will be 
no objective answer to the question of whether results are sufficiently robust to justify policy reliance on them. 
173 Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 158, at 827.  
174 Id. at 827-28. 
175 Id. at 830. 
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used to assess the validity of instruments,176 the authors of the original studies can still claim that 
the instruments used were the best available.177 Casual empiricism about empiricism suggests 
that the persuasiveness of many instrumental variables studies will often be debated.178 The 
increased complexity of an instrumental variables study provides an additional layer of 
complexity about which statisticians can argue. This additional layer increases the number of 
choices that researchers face, potentially increasing the danger that studies will be subject to 
publication bias.179 
b. Regression discontinuity studies 
Another approach to pseudorandom experimentation, regression discontinuity design,180 
may help establish causal relationships, but still demands subjective interpretive judgments. This 
design takes advantage of discontinuities in decisionmaking about individual cases. For example, 
M. Keith Chen and Jesse Shapiro note that federal prisoners are assigned to prisons based in part 
on a score reflecting the inmates’ need for supervision.181 Inmates with scores around certain 
thresholds are likely to be quite similar to one another, but are assigned different treatments 
based on which side of the thresholds they fall. The discontinuity serves as a natural experiment, 
and Chen and Shapiro use the experiment to assess whether harsher prison conditions reduce 
recidivism.182 
Although useful,183 such a natural experiment requires careful statistical analysis to 
ensure that the populations on either side of the line are sufficiently equivalent in relevant 
                                                 
176 See Jerry A. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 ECONOMETRICA 1251 (1978). 
177 See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Reply to Donohue and Wolfers on the Death Penalty and Deterrence, ECONOMIST’S VOICE, Apr. 
2008, available at http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Press/DeathPenalty(Rubin).pdf, at 2 (noting that while the instrumental 
variables may have been correlated with crime rights, “previous researchers believed (often based on empirical testing) that the 
instruments were as uncorrelated with crime rates as one was likely to find”). 
178 For another example, see Badi H. Baltagi & James M. Griffin, The Econometrics of Rational Addiction: The Case of 
Cigarettes, 19 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 449 (2001) (challenging an earlier paper using instrumental variables techniques, Gary S. 
Becker et al., An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 396 (1994), and offering an improved model).  
179 Esther Duflo has argued that publication bias may also be more problematic for instrumental variables studies for a technical 
reason. See, e.g., Duflo, supra note 167, at 353 (“[P]ublication bias may actually more than compensate for the reduction in bias 
caused by the use of an instrument, because they tend to have larger standard errors, and researchers looking for significant 
results will select only large estimates.” 
180 For an overview, see Jinyong Hahn et al., Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity 
Design, 69 ECONOMETRICA 201 (2001). 
181 M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2007). 
182 They conclude that such conditions do not reduce, and may even encourage, recidivism. See id. at 20. 
183 One study performed a regression discontinuity analysis in a context in which a randomized experiment was also performed, 
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respects. For example, Chen and Shapiro compared the demographics of two similar populations, 
and found significant demographic differences.184 Whether the populations are nonetheless 
similar in relevant ways requires some subjective judgment. Moreover, their analysis explicitly 
modeled the function “that relates an inmate’s score to his probability of recidivism,”185 
including binary controls for the cutoffs.186 A danger is that if there is an omitted variable in the 
analysis or a misspecification of the functional form, the coefficient estimates could be biased.  
Regression discontinuity studies require sufficient analytical judgment that their 
improved statistical power may not translate to a greater likelihood that the findings will be 
accepted in the public policy process. For example, a paper by Saurabh Bhargava and Vikram 
Pathania takes advantage of the discontinuity in cellular telephone rates around 9 p.m.187 Call 
volumes today increase discontinuously around the 9 p.m. threshold, but there has been no 
increase in accidents immediately after 9 p.m. relative to the period before cell companies began 
to offer free calling after 9 p.m. Nonetheless, policymakers have continued to proclaim cell 
phone driving as dangerous as driving under the influence of alcohol.188 A subsequent researcher, 
meanwhile, has minimized the Bhargava and Pathania findings, pointing out that the effects of 
cell phone use around 9 p.m. could be different from the effects at other times.189 Regression 
discontinuity studies do not necessarily have greater impact on the policy process than other 
studies, even for the relatively small number of issues for which they are feasible. 
                                                                                                                                                             
finding that the results were similar. See Hielke Buddelmeyer & Emmanuel Skoufias, An Evaluation of the Performance of 
Regression Discontinuity Design on PROGRESA (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3386, 2004). 
184 See Chen & Shapiro, supra note 181, at 16. 
185 Id. at 17. 
186 Id. at 20. 
187 Saurabh Bhargava & Vikram Pathania, Driving Under the (Cellular) Influence: The Link Between Cell Phone Use and 
Vehicle Crashes (AEI Working Paper No. 07-15, July 2007), at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-
safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/WP07-15_topost.pdf. 
188 See, e.g., Mike Stuckey, Hands-Free Phones Are Lifesavers, Study Says, MSNBC, May 13, 2008, at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24580099/ (quoting a California legislator who embraced a recent study on cell phones while 
apparently paying no heed to the Bhargava and Pathania study). 
189 See Jed Kolko, The Effects of Mobile Phones and Hands-Free Laws on Traffic Fatalities 5 (Pub. Pol’y Inst. of Cal. Working 
Paper No. 2007/07) (noting that Bhargava and Pathania acknowledged this possibility). Kolko’s study includes a difference-in-
differences analysis of the impact of hands-free laws that shows a statistically significant effect of the laws at the 0.05 level only 
for fatalities in wet road conditions. Id. at 32 tbl.7. A separate specification produced results at a 0.01 statistical significance level 
when a hands-free law was in effect 25 months or more, but this applied only to a single state. Id. at 35 tbl.10. Omitted variable 
bias could explain some of Kolko’s results. For example, Kolko notes that there were “contemporaneous policy changes” related 
to alcohol consumption by drivers and that this eliminates the statistical significance at the 0.05 level for some results. Id. at 20.  
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3. The Laboratory of the States Reconsidered 
For statistical research to influence policy, rather than merely serve as a sound bite, it 
must not only be executed well, but also be executed in a way that policymakers can understand 
and cannot ignore. These challenges pose hurdles for a frequent justification of federalism, that 
allowing states to make independent choices provides for a kind of laboratory testing of 
policy.190 Susan Rose-Ackerman has shown that federalism may insufficiently promote 
experimentation for numerous reasons,191 for example because one state may hope to free-ride on 
the activities of other governments.192 Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have similarly noted 
that experimentation sometimes may be expensive and likely not on balance beneficial for the 
experimenter, 193  and so centralized coordination may be needed to take full advantage of 
federalism. 194 
Yet, at least sometimes, states do change their policies and take risks in doing so in the 
hope of achieving informational benefits.195 As Barry Friedman notes, states may innovate for a 
variety of reasons, quite apart from any desire to engage in “experimentation.”196 These state 
innovations serve at least a crude experimentation function.197 Commentators may observe that 
one state’s approach to a particular issue, such as health care reform,198 has gone particularly 
                                                 
190 The classic statement of this theory is Justice Brandeis’s. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). For a 
discussion of this justification for federalism, Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional 
Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750-76 (2004). 
191 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 
(1980). 
192 Id. at 594. The possibility that there might be insufficient incentives to innovate is apparent even in areas in which state 
competition has generally been trumpted, such as corporate governance law. See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to 
the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2003) (arguing that there are suboptimal incentives for states to innovate in corporate law). But 
see Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. 
ON REG. 209 (2006) (arguing that states are in fact effective laboratories in the corporate charter context). 
193 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 923-26 (1994).  
194 Id. at 926 (noting that absent coordination by a central authority, “state-initiated experiments are unlikely to be truly useful to 
other states because of more specific, technical variations” among the states). 
195 See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[S]tate 
experimentation is no judicial myth.”).   
196 Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 399 (1997) (“’Innovation’ might have been a better word choice 
for Justice Brandeis than ‘experimentation,’ saving us all a lot of bother.”). 
197 Dorf and Sabel express more confidence in the ability of state innovations to improve knowledge, as long as there is some 
centralized evaluation of state activities. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 1, at 345 (explaining how administrative agencies can 
serve as “the continuing organized link between the national and the local, helping to create through national action the local 
conditions for experimentation, and changing national arrangements accordingly.”). 
198 See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (1992). 
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badly or well, and this may influence their decisionmaking. Federalism, however, does not easily 
facilitate a scientific approach to experimentation. The difficulty that social scientists and 
especially policymakers face in assessing the results of state innovations contributes to the 
inaptness of the states-as-laboratories metaphor.  
Still, federalism may be more conducive to experimentation than alternatives. Previous 
commentators have noted that randomized experiments are much more common in North 
America than in the rest of the world,199 and speculated that federalism may help explain this.200 
In any event, the mere existence of different jurisdictions could be conducive to randomized 
experimentation in two ways. First, it may be possible to randomize policies across states, at 
least among states that consent. It would be more awkward to randomize policies in the absence 
of generally accepted jurisdictional boundaries. And second, states themselves can serve as loci 
for experimentation at smaller jurisdictional levels, such as cities and counties. Indeed, 
randomized experiments have increasingly been conducted within states.201 Perhaps federalism 
will someday produce a stream of experimental data. The next section will argue, however, that 
even this may be insufficient absent self-execution. 
B. Limits of Randomization Studies 
Advocates of randomized studies have emphasized that only this type of study can 
establish causality with high confidence. For example, Esther Duflo has argued that “while it is 
always possible to reject experimental results on the grounds that the experiment was poorly 
designed, or failed, when an experiment is correctly implemented (which is relatively easy to 
ascertain), there is no doubt that it gives us the effect of the manipulation that was 
implemented.”202 But what “is relatively easy to ascertain” may still remain controversial in 
public debate. Moreover, even if the measured effects can be confidently traced to the 
“manipulation,” some extrapolation will generally be needed to assess the full consequences of a 
                                                 
199 See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 38 (noting as an exception that the Netherlands tested an unemployment-counseling 
program). 
200 Id. One justification for this is that “[f]ederal funds for particular programs may be used with considerable discretion by the 
states, and this fact has encouraged the view that the states should literally be the laboratories of democracy.” Id.  
201 See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 37-38. 
202 Esther Duflo, Field Experiments in Development Economics (Jan. 2006), http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/800, at 23. 
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law enacting the legal experiment. This section explains that this is so because of difficulties 
with both measurement and replication. 
The problems identified here can generally afflict nonrandomized studies as well. The 
argument for randomized rather than nonrandomized studies, though, cannot be only that 
randomized studies are more definitive. Even if policymakers and public debate recognize the 
benefits of randomization, there will still be enough room for debate that these studies’ impact is 
not likely to be proportional to the quality of information that they produce. Randomized studies 
do, however, facilitate self-execution. The imperfections and likely effects of randomized studies 
can be gauged by policymakers relatively easily in advance of the studies. As a result, 
policymakers should be able to commit in advance to particular legal outcomes dependent on the 
studies’ results. At least ex ante, the results of randomized experiments will generally have clear 
implications, if not for exactly what policy should be, then at least for whether there is greater 
justification than before for moving policy in a particular direction. That is not true for 
nonrandomized experiments, which will generally not produce a single outcome measure or 
measures that policymakers could easily agree on in advance. 
1. Measurement Problems 
a. Elusive effects 
Legal policies can have easy-to-measure and hard-to-measure effects. Numerical 
assessments of randomized experiments will tend to focus on easy-to-measure variables, but 
observers may care about other variables too. Suppose, for example, that a jurisdiction is 
considering adopting criminal shame sanctions.203 Even placing aside nonconsequentialist 
concerns, one might care about how much a shame sanction would reduce recidivism and deter 
crime. The former is likely easier to measure than the latter, and hardest of all to measure would 
be whether the shame sanctions degrades society, indirectly producing other adverse 
consequences.204 If some observers care mostly about recidivism, while others care mostly about 
general deterrence and social degradation, experimentation might not be of much use. Such a 
                                                 
203 See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (1998) (arguing that shame 
sanctions may promote moral educate); David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist 
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301 (2001) (arguing in favor of some and against some shame sanctions). 
204 See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059 (1998) (arguing 
against shame sanctions on the ground that they involve “a specifies of official lynch justice”). 
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dispute concerns values rather than empirics. If, however, recidivism is important to both 
proponents and opponents of shame sanctions, then experimentation may be useful, even if the 
results of such an experiment would not produce consensus. As long as there is disagreement ex 
ante about the shame sanction’s effect on recidivism, with opponents of the sanction more likely 
to doubt that it would reduce recidivism, parties who could not agree on the merits might agree 
to a self-executing randomized experiment.205 
Randomized experimentation, however, may fail to bring parties closer together if 
policymakers on one side of an issue believe that achieving success on an easy-to-measure 
variable would be correlated with failure on hard-to-measure variables. Consider, for example, a 
law that implements standards-based education reform, such as the No Child Left Behind Act.206 
Some worry that the Act will push schools to focus only on measurable proxies for student 
learning, such as multiple choice test scores.207 The experimentation literature labels this the 
“multitasking problem,”208 where “individuals facing high-powered incentive schemes may 
change their behavior in such a way that the proximate outcome on which the rewards are based 
increases, but the ultimate outcome in which the principal is interested remains constant or even 
decreases.”209 A self-executing experiment could test standards-based reforms, with different 
rules applied to randomly selected states or school districts. But if opponents believe that these 
reforms improve multiple choice scores at learning’s expense, they will resist a self-executing 
experiment dependent on such scores, unless they believe that proponents have exaggerated even 
the reforms’ effects on those scores. Any agreement on a self-executing experiment would 
depend on development of some alternative measurement metric. For example, a randomly 
selected subset of students might sit for an exam with essay and open-ended questions, under an 
agreement that the grades would be used to assess the reforms but not to determine district or 
teacher outcomes.210 
                                                 
205 See supra Part II.A.2. 
206 Pub. L. No. 107-110, Jan. 8, 2002, 115 Stat. 1425. 
207 See, e.g., Lisa Kelly, Yearning for Lake Wobegon: The Quest for the Best Test at the Expense of the Best Education, 7 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 41 (1998).   
208 See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job 
Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991). 
209 See Duflo, supra note 202, at 5. 
210 There already exists a federal test, known as the National Assessment of Educational Progress, that is applied to a subset of 
students and not used to assess individual students or schools. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left 
Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 943-44 (2004). But the test is not currently used to test the Act itself (with some school 
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At times, policymakers might commit to resolving a randomized experiment based on a 
cost-benefit analysis, conducted pursuant to the professional standards generally applicable to 
such analyses.211 Indeed, cost-benefit analysis has increasingly been used in measuring the 
results of randomized experiments,212 and a virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that it reduces 
diverse variables to a single metric, dollars.213 Critics of cost-benefit analysis, however, complain 
that such analysis sometimes inappropriately makes value choices, in particular making hard 
variables more important than soft variables.214 Cost-benefit analysis can serve as a viable 
procedure for measuring experimental outcomes where both sides believe that cost is a 
reasonable proxy for the effectiveness of an experiment, or where the threshold for success is 
adjusted based on the perception that the analysis might shortchange certain variables that would 
favor one position.  
b. Imperfect randomization 
A computer can randomize between treatment and control groups, but it is not always 
straightforward to ensure that the treatment group receives the treatment and the control group 
does not. Dangers include attrition (where some randomized individuals or entities drop out of a 
study), crossover (where some control group members receive the treatment, or vice versa), and 
spillovers (where the treatment has some effect on the control group as well). None of these 
problems, however, presents an insurmountable challenge to self-executing randomized 
experiments. 
i. Attrition 
Attrition is a problem not merely because it decreases the size of the sample, but also 
because it may bias experimental results when the attrition rate depends on selection for 
                                                                                                                                                             
districts assigned to the Act’s regime and some assigned to another regime). 
211 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
212 Increasingly, cost-benefit analysis has been used to test programs. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 36-37 (noting that only 
27% of early social experiments used cost-impact comparisons, but that 60% of more recent tests did, and that recently there 
“was an attempt to measure as many benefits and costs in monetary terms as possible and then to compare the benefits received 
by all members of society to the costs incurred by all members of society”). 
213 Experiments may have even greater political saliency when they demonstrate that they produce some benefit at no 
government cost. The Unemployment Bonus Experiment results, for example, indicated that in many treatments, there was net 
savings to the federal government. That is, paying bonuses for leaving unemployment led to less governmental expenditure. See, 
e.g., GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 184. Ayres describes how this actually affected the government’s decision on the 
program. See AYRES, supra note 62, at 65-67. 
214 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2042-69 (1998) (elaborating on this 
argument). 
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treatment. Consider, for example, studies assessing improvements made by schools in a 
developing country. A school’s randomization into a comparison group might increase drop-out 
rates.215 If the drop-outs tend to be the weaker students, and if the measurement of school success 
depends on tests of current students, then the attrition produces an artificial hurdle for the 
treatment. Attrition can also bias results when randomization occurs at the level of the individual. 
In a medical study, for example, people who receive the treatment but then suffer severe side 
effects might refuse to participate further in the study, making those who continue with the 
treatment a nonrepresentative sample. 
Given any degree of attrition, those reviewing a study may argue about the best 
interpretation of the results. Statisticians may attempt to impute measurements for those who 
drop out, by comparing their characteristics with those of other subjects.216 But this solution is 
imperfect, because there might be some unmeasurable difference between those who continue in 
an experiment and those who drop out. Ultimately, sound statistical judgment is needed to assess 
such models’ reliability. In a public policy context, those who do not like the normative 
implications of a randomized experiment will often be able to criticize it, rightly or wrongly, 
based on attrition.  
A more administrable solution is to use matched samples.217 If someone from the 
treatment group drops out, results of the corresponding match from the control group are not 
counted either. This approach can be used also when randomization is at the institutional or 
jurisdictional level, if individuals can be matched across institutions or jurisdictions. With 
matching, it is not necessary ex post to construct a model that seeks to correct for attrition bias, 
which would increase the danger of subjectivity or manipulation. Statisticians would be needed 
to assign the original matches based on observable characteristics, but the matching would be 
difficult to manipulate, before it is known who will drop out. 
                                                 
215 See, e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee et al., Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India, 122 Q.J. 
ECON. 1235, 1245 (2007) (discussing this problem). 
216 See, e.g., Richard B. Miller & David W. Wright, Detecting and Correcting Attrition Bias in Longitudinal Family Research, 
57 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 921, 923 (1995) (describing the standard method of incorporating a variable representing the 
probability of dropping out directly into the stud 
217 See ESTHER DUFLO ET AL., USING RANDOMIZATION IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RESEARCH: A TOOLKIT 35-36 (2006), 
http://www.povertyactionlab.com/papers/Using%20Randomization%20in%20Development%20Economics.pdf (“An extreme 
version of blocked design is the pairwise matched design where pairs of units are constituted, and in each pair, one unit is 
randomly assigned to the treatment and one unit is randomly assigned to the control.”). 
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This approach has a significant disadvantage. It throws away data that a neutral 
statistician might find valuable. Once again, a simplified statistical procedure may be superior in 
a public policy context to a more sophisticated procedure that a neutral statistician might choose, 
because the simple procedure is less manipulable. The simplified procedure does not eliminate 
the problem of attrition bias. Unmeasurable differences may lead to imperfect matching and 
some residual attrition bias. This should not pose an insurmountable problem for ex ante 
commitment or negotiation. Either the direction of the residual bias is unpredictable, in which 
case it should not thwart negotiations ex ante, or policymakers will anticipate some degree of 
bias, in which case this may affect the thresholds at which self-executing policies will take 
effect.  
ii. Crossover 
Legal experimentation may be less vulnerable to crossover than other social 
experimentation. When a particular legal regime is assigned to some individual or entity, that is 
not easy to escape. But imperfections may occur nonetheless, especially if the government 
wishes to leave some room for later discretion. For example, a social experiment on police 
response to domestic violence randomized those accused of domestic violence so that only some 
were chosen for automatic arrest.218 Officers, however, were given the discretion to arrest those 
not randomly selected, and so some individuals in the control group migrated to the treatment 
group.219 Crossover can also occur if well-connected people can thwart random assignment. Alan 
Krueger, studying the effect of student to teacher ratios, found that some parents had managed to 
convince schools to reallocate their children from large to small classes.220 This dilutes the 
treatment, as the small classes become larger, and means that the treated students on average will 
come from relatively highly motivated families. 
Once again, statistical correctives exist. Under an “intention-to-treat” methodology,221 an 
individual or entity who crosses over is counted with the group to which that person or entity 
                                                 
218 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. 
SOCIOLOGY REV. 261 (1984) (finding that arrest of domestic violence suspects deterred subsequent violent behavior). 
219 See id. at 264 (discussing the attrition problem and noting that 78% of perpetrators assigned to receive advice were arrested 
instead). 
220 Alan B. Krueger, Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 497, 505 (1999) (reporting 
higher attrition rates of students in smaller classes). 
221 See, e.g., Guido Imbens & Joshua Angrist, Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects, 62 
ECONOMETRICA 467 (1994) (discussing this approach).. 
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was originally assigned. This reduces the measured effect of the treatment. Statisticians can 
compensate for the bias introduced by the intention-to-treat approach with a simple mathematical 
formula.222 It is a close call whether it makes sense in a randomized legal experiment for this 
adjustment to be specified ex ante. This compensation makes the experiment more obtuse. 
Assuming, however, that it is possible to measure who ended up receiving the treatment and who 
ended up receiving the control, the formula can be applied mechanically, without allowing any 
discretion to the experimenters, and will generally improve the estimate of the treatment effect. 
This is an imperfect adjustment, because those who cross over may differ systematically 
from those who do not. In theory, more elaborate adjustments are possible, with models 
projecting what the outcomes of those who cross-over would have been had they not. But once 
again, although many statisticians would think this sensible, for public policy purposes, any 
improvement in accuracy may not be worth the increase in subjectivity and manipulability. If 
crossover bias is an acute concern, policymakers can insist on the same solution as suggested 
above for attrition bias, using matched samples and excluding both the observations that cross 
over and their matches. This results in throwing away twice the data, and so may bring us even 
further from what statisticians might suggest, and it remains an imperfect solution given the 
possibility of imperfect matching of samples. But it may be enough to allow negotiations over 
self-executing experiments. 
iii. Spillovers  
The final danger, and at times the most troubling one for randomized legal 
experimentation, is that the treatment will spill over on the control group. Suppose, for example, 
that a shame sanction reduces recidivism not only in those who are shamed, but also in those 
who are randomized to the control group but hear about the shaming. Or, suppose that firms 
randomized to a relaxed securities disclosure regime decide that they want to disclose as much as 
their competitors. The comparison of treatment and control groups will underestimate the effects 
of the intervention. On the other hand, suppose that a random experiment eliminates speed limits 
on a random set of roads. Some drivers on the control roads may conclude that police, needing to 
                                                 
222 As Esther Duflo explains, a statistician can “scale up the difference [between the treatment and the control group] by dividing 
it by the difference in the probability of receiving the treatment in those two groups.” Duflo, supra note 167, at 354.  
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fill their time somehow, will devote extra attention to the control roads. If these drivers slow 
down, measurements of the speed differential will be exaggerated. 
A sometimes feasible solution is to randomize across geographical areas rather than 
individuals. Edward Miguel and Michael Kremer showed that randomized studies at an 
individual level had underestimated the benefits of deworming drugs, which benefited those in 
the immediate area who had not received the drugs.223 Randomizing across geographical areas 
largely solved the problem. This solution is not without drawbacks, however. Especially if the 
number of jurisdictions is small, a comparison of changes in treatment and control jurisdictions 
may not have much statistical power. In addition, some people may move to take advantage of 
the law elsewhere.224 For example, if a study eliminates the minimum wage in randomly selected 
counties, then some workers may cross county lines in search of minimum wage jobs. This could 
have various effects on measurement, such as resulting in an underestimation of the increase in 
unemployment, if any, attributable to a minimum wage.225 
Any attempts to correct statistically for the problem of spillovers will involve guesswork. 
Often no objective metric of whether a spillover has occurred exists. If the spillover is 
measurable, statisticians still need to devise corrective regression models. The best policy 
reaction then may be to ignore the spillover. This need not be problematic, so long as 
policymakers recognize what such an experiment measures. Many laws have both direct effects 
on regulated individuals or entities and indirect effects, typically via social norms.226 A 
randomized experiment generally measures the extent of the direct effects over and above the 
indirect effects. With spillovers, what is measurable will therefore be a smaller part of the overall 
policy calculus. The lower the relevance of what is empirically measurable, the less beneficial 
randomized experimentation will be, but it can still be useful in facilitating policymaker 
agreement.  
                                                 
223 Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presdence of Treatment 
Externalities, 72 ECONOMETRICA 159 (2004). 
224 Randomization across geographic areas can produce Tiebout sorting in much the same way as endogenous policy selection. 
See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (providing the seminal account 
of the effects of citizen mobility). 
225 These complexities may, however, be considerably smaller than those inherent in analyzing existing policies. See, e.g., David 
Card & Alan B. Krueger, Time-Series Minimum-Wage Studies: A Meta-Analysis, 85 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 
238 (1995) (reviewing various studies). 
226 See, e.g., GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 15 (“[A]n important aspect of some policy innovations intended for widespread 
adaptation is that they cause changes in community attitudes and norms; these, in turn, result in feedback effects that influence 
the innovation’s success.”). 
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2. Generalizability 
The generalizability concern is that the treatment group might behave differently if a 
policy were enacted permanently after the experiment, and thus, as with spillovers, the concern is 
that measured effects may differ from actual effects.  
a. Awareness of experimental context 
People in an experiment may behave or respond differently if they know they are in an 
experiment and if they know that they are in the treatment group. In medical experiments, a blind 
design can eliminate the latter problem but not the former.227 With randomized legal 
experiments, it will generally not be possible to conceal from participants whether they have 
been assigned to a treatment or a control group. This makes possible both “Hawthorne 
effects,”228 in which the treatment group responds to being treated, for example by working to 
ensure the experiment’s success or failure, and “John Henry effects,”229 in which the comparison 
group responds to not being treated.230 Little can be done to prevent Hawthorne and John Henry 
effects or to adjust for them in other than a speculative way. These effects seem unlikely to be 
generally large, however, especially for policies that affect people in nontrivial ways. Ex post, 
any study result can be questioned on the theory that some Hawthorne or John Henry effect 
might have occurred, and so these effects furnish another reason that using experimentation 
simply to produce more information for the policy process is unlikely to be beneficial. But ex 
ante, policymakers can make armchair estimates of these effects and negotiate around them. 
                                                 
227 The most obvious way that this might occur is through the placebo effect. Research has shown that patients will sometimes 
respond medically even when not treated if they believe that they might be. See Anup Malani, Identifying Placebo Effects with 
Data from Clinical Trials, 114 J. POL. ECON. 236 (2006) (verifying the existence of placebo effects on the basis of differential 
probabilities of random assignment to the treatment).  
228 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 34 (1956) (claiming that increased productivity in an industrial 
experiment by Hawthorne was a result of experimenters’ behavior toward those treated). But see Stephen R.G. Jones, Was There 
a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 451 (1992) (questioning the existence of the effect by scrutinizing Hawthorne’s 
original study). 
229 See, e.g., Allen C. Barrett & Doris A. White, How John Henry Effects Confound the Measurement of Self-Esteem in Primary 
Prevention Programs for Drug Abuse in Middle Schools, 36 J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC. 87 (1991) (providing an alleged example 
of John Henry effects). 
230 DUFLO ET AL., supra note 217, at 68 (“The comparison group may feel offended to be a comparison group and react by also 
altering their behavior (for example, teachers in the comparison group for an evaluation may ‘compete’ with the treatment 
teachers or, on the contrary, decide to slack off).”). 
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b. Differences in experimental context  
Even absent behavior changing because of knowledge of the experiment, the 
experimental context may differ from the context in which a policy ultimately would be 
implemented. The experiment might affect a different population, be on a smaller scale, involve 
a different legal change, test only marginal policy changes, occur for only a limited period of 
time, or involve greater or lesser commitments of resources. 
The population may differ if an experiment is tried in only one location or only with 
some nonrandom subset of the individuals and entities who would eventually be affected by a 
law. Cost considerations may justify such nonrepresentativeness, and indeed it is common for 
“demonstration projects” to be deployed in one or more particular regions rather than 
randomly.231 Sometimes, it may be feasible to conduct randomization at a national level, for 
example in choosing Medicare recipients who will receive extra follow-up phone calls, but 
coordination and data-gathering needs may make this difficult. At times, skepticism about 
inferences from an experiment on a nonrepresentative population may be justified.232 For 
example, a randomized securities disclosure experiment on a sample of small firms might not 
extrapolate easily to a sample of large firms.233 
Scale may be an even more important concern. A common criticism of laboratory 
experiments is that people may not behave as they would in other decisionmaking contexts, 
because the stakes are too trivial.234 Similar problems can affect randomized experiments. 
Suppose, for example, that the federal government tested the minimum wage by randomly 
selecting one percent of adults, allowing those selected the option of informing employers that 
they would not need to be paid minimum wage. In theory, eliminating the minimum wage might 
increase employment.  But businesses may not think it worthwhile to change their hiring 
                                                 
231 For a discussion of the transition from local demonstration projects to projects on a national scale, see Duflo, supra note 167, 
at 342-45. 
232 See, e.g., GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 15 (““[I]mpact estimates frequently are limited to relatively few geographic 
areas. Because the sites are rarely selected randomly, the external validity of the evaluations can be questioned.”). 
233 It is possible, for example, that the expense of disclosure is burdensome for small firms but trivial for large ones. Cf., e.g., 
Paul Rose, Balancing Public Market Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
707, 733-34 (2005) (considering evidence that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is causing small firms especially to go private). Similarly, 
disclosure may be more important for large firms with many divisions and operations. On the other hand, it may be easier to 
execute frauds at smaller firms, making disclosure more important for these firms. 
234 Duflo, supra note 202, at 21. This helps explain why researchers studying social norms through ultimatum games have 
experimented in developing countries, where it is feasible to make the stakes large enough to affect experimental subjects’ 
welfare. See, e.g., Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak 
Republic, 66 ECONOMETRICA 569 (1998). 
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practices, or to risk dissension from inconsistent wages, to have the chance to hire a few workers 
at a lower wage. Data from such a study therefore might not reliably reflect the effect of 
eliminating the minimum wage.  
Randomized experiments also cannot be used to assess uncontroversially policies other 
than the ones tested. Suppose, for example, that a randomized test of laws allowing possession of 
concealed handguns were instituted, with different counties in a state randomly assigned to 
different regimes. The debate on the “more guns, less crime” hypothesis has largely focused on 
such statutes,235 but the broader debate concerns many government policies affecting the 
incidence of handgun ownership. Those who believe that laws permitting concealed handguns 
reduce crime may think that this supports relaxation of other gun control rules (such as 
mandatory waiting periods), while those who believe that such laws increase crime may think 
that this supports broader gun control (such as handgun registration requirements). A randomized 
study presumably would shed some light on these issues, and perhaps legislators on both sides 
could agree to a bidirectional self-executing legal experiment of concealed carry laws that could 
result in collateral legal changes. Because other gun control policies could have different effects, 
it is unlikely that such a randomized experiment, if not self-executing, would have much indirect 
policy influence on these other questions. 
Even where the same legal policy is at issue, the legal changes effected by an experiment 
will generally be temporary, and responses to temporary laws may be different from responses to 
permanent laws. Sometimes, this danger will be obvious. For example, tax theorists recognize 
that taxpayers may change the timing of income recognition to take advantage of anticipated 
changes in tax rules.236 As a result, randomly granting some taxpayers a one-percent tax decrease 
in a particular year as a test of supply-side taxation theories would likely exaggerate the effects 
of a decrease in taxes on income.237 Policymakers might design the study to more closely 
approximate the effects of a permanent law, perhaps by focusing only on components of income 
whose recognition is not as easily timed. But unless experiments are permanent for the affected 
                                                 
235 See, e.g., LOTT, supra note 165. 
236 See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 
TAX L. REV. 1 (1992) (providing an economic analysis of recognition). 
237 This point may apply just as strongly to experiments on government support. Commentators have pointed out that individuals 
may work more during an experiment providing them government services if they believe that the support will not continue 
through time. See, e.g., Frank P. Stafford, Income-Maintenance Policy and Work Effort: Learning from Experiments and Labor-
Market Studies, in SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 3, at 95, 101. 
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population (for example, through a commitment to give some taxpayers a permanent drop in tax 
rates), there will almost always be some subjective extrapolation needed to determine how much 
the temporary nature of an experiment affected outcomes. 
Sometimes an experiment measures only marginal effects, either because the experiment 
is temporary or because the experiment explicitly limits itself to an intervention at the margin.238 
There is no guarantee that marginal effects will at least correctly identify the approximate impact 
of the policy. For example, in the hypothetical concealed carry experiment, a permanent law 
might encourage more people to possess concealed handguns than a temporary law, but it is not 
clear how the additional group of adopters differs from the group that responds even to the 
temporary law. Perhaps the initial responders will tend to include more criminals seeking to take 
advantage of the law and the subsequent group will be more law-abiding, but this is only 
speculation. The early and late adopter groups may differ culturally, and an exploration of these 
differences would require controversial analysis.  
Sometimes, a temporary law may be a poor proxy for long term effects because the law 
will have dynamic as well as static effects. Studies, for example, that seek to assess private 
school choice plans may fail to capture what proponents of such plans claim is a principal 
benefit, that free enterprise will allow educational entrepreneurs to learn over time what 
works.239 Other arguments, however, suggest that a static analysis might overestimate the 
benefits of free choice; for example, in the short term for-profit schools might be willing to lose 
money in the hope of increasing the chance of being permitted to continue to receive public 
funds in the future. As another example, critics of the time-of-use electricity experiments argued 
that with a longer term study, customers would buy appliances that would help them adjust their 
electricity use based on time of day.240 Whether or not this argument is persuasive, the ease of 
constructing such an argument helps explain why past randomized experiments have not had 
greater public policy effects. 
                                                 
238 See, e.g., Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the 
Impacts (June 25, 2007), available at http://ipa.phpwebhosting.com/images_ipa/ExpandingCreditAccess.v3.pdf (reporting an 
experiment in which lending criteria were loosened for randomly selected marginal borrowers). 
239 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 557, 571 (2008) 
(making this point). 
240 See, e.g., JOSKOW at 46 (noting that “these experiments only allow us to estimate short-run elasticities of demand, given 
existing appliance stocks”).  
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One or more of the above problems will affect, to a lesser or greater degree, most 
randomized experiments. But randomized experiments still provide useful information and 
should change a neutral Bayesian policy analysts’ priors about the effects of policy interventions, 
sometimes dramatically. Often, though, the policy response to randomized experiments seems 
likely to be less than the informational content of the experiments would justify. Self-executing 
randomized experiments, even where improving information about only one facet of a complex 
policy problem, can combat this. There is a danger that advance commitment will lead to 
unjustified legal responses to experimental change, but for many of the problems detailed above, 
policymakers should be able to anticipate the limitations of the experiments. In a legal culture 
that embraced experimentation, policymakers could negotiate and commit to proportional legal 
changes in response to randomized experiments. 
IV. GUIDELINES FOR AND OBJECTIONS TO LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION 
A. Guidelines 
In many respects, randomized, self-executing experiments should conform to ordinary 
principles of experimentation. For example, there should be a large enough sample to generate 
meaningful results.241 There is no magic number for all experiments; a small number of 
observations may be enough if the measured effect of the intervention is anticipated to be large, 
but a large number may be needed for small anticipated measured effects. Those who hope that a 
self-executing experiment will produce results in their favor have some incentive to ensure that 
the sample is sufficiently large that noise is unlikely to obscure general effects. The higher the 
number of observations, the better chance that any actual effect will correctly be identified as 
existing at any particular threshold of statistical significance. Policymakers need not, however, 
choose any particular level of statistical significance, such as 0.05, as the threshold for self-
execution. Statisticians have long recognized these thresholds as arbitrary.242 Instead, 
policymakers might identify cutoffs for self-execution based on raw numbers, for example 
promising to adopt a new policy if the treatment group performs 10% better on some measure 
than the control group. This enhances the comprehensibility of the experiment.  
                                                 
241 See, e.g., DUFLO ET AL., supra note 217, at 29 (discussing the issue of sample size in randomized experiments). 
242 See, e.g., Lester V. Manderscheid, Significance Levels, 0.05, 0.01, or ?, 47 J. FARM ECON. 1381 (1965) (urging that the 
applicable level of statistical significance be tailored to a particular purpose). 
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To set cutoffs, policymakers need some understanding of what the treatment and control 
policies are. Legislators need not specify all details; they may delegate these decisions to an 
administrative agency. Ideally, the treatment and control policies should produce meaningful 
information about laws that might be self-executed after the experiment. Meanwhile, 
policymakers must consider the unit of analysis at which randomization occurs.243 If 
randomization is at the jurisdictional or institutional level, then even if there are many affected 
individuals or entities, the number of independent observations is the number of separately 
randomized units. Statistical analysis could be used to assess individual responses to policies, but 
only at the risk of reintroducing omitted variable bias. Finally, policymakers should generally 
use matched samples, with matching occurring before the experiment on all available variables, 
to reduce attrition bias.  
A final, but more controversial, design suggestion is to avoid problems of self-selection 
and attrition by making participation mandatory. Social experiments to date have largely been 
opt-in, allowing individuals to choose whether to participate and then perhaps also whether to 
opt out.244 This is not surprising given the conventional view of social experimentation as a form 
of academic research. Academics cannot experiment on research subjects without informed 
consent.245 But governments in theory could make participation in a randomized experiment 
mandatory and even institute reporting requirements. There will always be some people who 
ignore the rules, and some unavoidable attrition, due to factors like emigration and death. But a 
government could either not count such individuals (and their matches) or develop some other 
convention for how to count them.246 The question is whether experiments without informed 
consent would be ethical.  
                                                 
243 See, e.g., DUFLO ET AL., supra note 217, at 40. 
244 Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane, Introduction and Summary, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 10, at 1, 7. 
245 See generally Kathryn A. Tuthill, Human Experimentation, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 221 (1997) (providing a legal overview). 
246 The convention might depend on context. For example, in an experiment on securities disclosure, the bankruptcy of a 
corporation could count as stock price declining to zero. An individual’s death might count as a bad result in a health care policy 
experiment, but simply be ignored in an experiment on fee shifting in court cases. 
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B. Objections 
1. Objections to Randomness 
a. Ethical concerns 
This Article’s treatment of the ethics of randomized legal experiments will be brief for 
two reasons. First, the Article’s general argument does not depend on a resolution of whether the 
government must obtain informed consent. Even with an informed consent requirement, 
randomized experimentation could still occur for many policies. For example, there will 
generally be no ethical objections to an experiment like the Medicare experiment,247 where any 
participant may choose not to receive the services offered by the government. (There may be 
objections based on inequality among those who volunteer for the experiment, an issue to which 
the Article will return below.248) Second, an existing collection of essays already explores this 
issue in considerable detail.249  
This section will briefly summarize and develop the argument that legal experimentation 
imposes no ethical hurdles beyond those inherent in general legal policymaking, while also 
sketching the opposing position. The argument against an informed consent requirement 
distinguishes legal from medical experimentation,250 where informed consent is generally 
required.251 An unconsented-to medical treatment violates a patient’s bodily integrity rights.252 
The problem is not randomization. A state could not insist that all of its citizens take a new drug. 
Any rights that the individual has against the state constrain the state in legal experimentation. 
So, if a person has a right not to have property taken by the state,253 then the state cannot take 
                                                 
247 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
248 See infra Part IV.B.1.b. 
249 See ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 10. 
250 Rivlin and Timpane summarize this argument as follows: 
[S]chool officials make decisions all the time that involve adoption of new curricula or educational approaches without 
firm knowledge of what the effects will be. There is always some chance of harm to some or all children which has to 
be weighed against the possible benefits of the change. Calling the change an ‘experiment’ does not alter the moral 
dilemma involved or call for special rules. Such rules might have the perverse effect of putting special obstacles in the 
way of careful examination and evaluation of change, while allowing quite drastic changes that had no experimental or 
tentative flavor to proceed unquestioned. 
Rivlin & Timpane, supra note 244, at 5. 
251 See Tuthill, supra note 245. 
252 An early legal case insisting on informed consent frames the problem in these terms: “Every human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable.” Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
253 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
59 
LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION 
 
that property in an experiment. But to the extent that a government can enact a policy generally, 
on the Lockean theory of implicit consent,254 there should be no ethical bar to the state enacting 
the policy only against a random set of individuals.  
                                                
The opposing position flows from the Kantian principle that each person should be 
treated as an end rather than only as a means.255 This principle also does not uniquely condemn 
randomization. Suppose a jurisdiction decides to enact a new universally applicable policy, even 
though policymakers suspect that it will not be effective but has enough of a chance of success to 
make it worth trying. If this counts as treating people as means only, then the ethical 
permissibility of a new policy must be judged excluding from consideration any benefit from the 
fact that implementation of the policy will produce information about the policy. But many legal 
regimes, such as patent law and securities law, are justified in part on the basis that they improve 
information. Information produced by a policy about the policy itself should not be uniquely 
condemned to irrelevance. 
But assuming then that experimentation with universally applicable policies is ethical, is 
random policy experimentation ethical as well? An affirmative case focuses on the benefit of 
randomization, that it will produce better information than nonrandomized experiments.256 
Although this may at first appear to be a purely consequentialist justification, Robert Veatch 
argues that subjects of research have a right not to be put “at risk in an unnecessary experiment 
or one inefficiently designed.”257 The Nuremberg principles on medical experimentation 
emphasized the importance of experimental design.258 If universal experimentation is 
permissible, there is then an a fortiori argument that random experimentation must be 
permissible as well. The difference between the universal and the random experiment is that 
some people do not receive the treatment. Unless there is an equality right to receive the 
treatment,259 this difference should not make the experiment more problematic. 
 
254 See Peter G. Brown, Informed Consent in Social Experimentation: Some Cautionary Notes, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF 
SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 10, at 95-96. 
255 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 429 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785) 
(“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a 
means but always at the same time as an end.”). 
256 See supra Part III. 
257 Robert M. Veatch, Ethical Principles in Medical Experimentation, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION, supra, at 21, 37. 
258 Id. at 37-38. 
259 See infra Part IV.B.1.b. 
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Medical experimentation itself further supports the argument that if universal policy 
experiments are permissible, policy experiments must be permissible as well, because medical 
experiments can generally be viewed equivalently as legal experiments. Subjects in medical 
experiments who give informed consent presumably would prefer a guarantee of receiving the 
treatment rather than a chance of a placebo. The status quo is a legal regime that constrains 
liberty by forbidding distribution of the treatment. Let us assume that the legal prohibition on 
what Eugene Volokh has called “medical self-defense” is permissible.260 When the government 
authorizes a medical experiment,261 it is effectively authorizing a new legal regime in which 
patients are permitted to have access to the treatment. The government does not authorize this 
new legal regime in a universally applicable way, but instead insists on randomization. Only 
some patients will legally have access to the treatment. It is thus sometimes permissible for new 
legal policies, including potentially pernicious ones, to be introduced randomly.  
This suggests that policy randomization is permissible, at least so long as the group being 
randomized gives informed consent. The argument for informed consent depends on the 
legitimacy of legal baselines: both Policy X and Policy Y are by assumption legally permissible 
options for policymakers, but if the current policy is X, then citizens may only be subject to 
Policy Y if they give informed consent, and vice-versa. The medical experimentation context 
shows how policymakers can manipulate such baselines. If the baseline were to allow patients to 
take a medication, then few would consent to being subject to a legal experiment in which they 
might at random be denied the right to the medicine (equivalently, to a medical experiment in 
which they might receive a placebo instead).  
Those who defend the legitimacy of medical experimentation must either develop an 
account of which baselines are permissible or allow legal policymakers to play the same game 
outside the medical context. Existing randomized legal experiments generally allow opt-in to an 
apparently more favorable treatment. For example, drug offenders may receive the option of 
participating in an experiment in which they might be randomized to a drug court.262 This makes 
                                                 
260 See generally Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel. Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(finding no constitutional right to investigational drugs); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental 
Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007) (arguing for a right to medical self-defense).  
261 Government experimentation is necessary for at least some medical experiments. In the United States, the FDA reviews 
small-scale Phase II trials to determine whether to permit large-scale Phase III trials. See, e.g., Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, 
Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 305 (1999-2000). 
262 See, e.g., Gottfredson & Exum, supra note 111. 
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experimentation a one-way ratchet, allowing testing within an existing draconian regime of a 
more lenient alternative, but not allowing testing of more draconian legal approaches. One could 
test raising the speed limit (by allowing drivers to opt into a program in which they are permitted 
to drive 10 mph over the limit), but to test lowering the speed limit, policymakers must change 
the baseline. An insistence on informed consent privileges the status quo legal regime over 
alternatives, even if neither the status quo nor the alternative applied universally violates any 
rights. 
Might there still be some limits to legal experimentation without informed consent, other 
than that the policy cannot violate any rights? It is possible to construct extreme hypotheticals. 
Imagine, for example, a state that wanted more information about the value of public education, 
and so decided that 1,000 students selected at random would be denied the right to a public 
education. This hypothetical appears powerful because only a few are randomly selected, 
because the damage done to the randomly selected is great, because there seems no realistic 
chance that the policy being tested will be enacted on a universal basis, and because of a view 
that there may be a right to a public education, even if that right is not constitutionally 
recognized.263 The case that the students are being used solely as a means appears particularly 
strong. But these factors also help explain why there is little chance such a policy would be 
enacted. Constituents do not want to face some chance of being randomly selected for harsh 
treatment. 
The existence of some problematic experiments that seem highly unlikely to be enacted, 
but that could be enacted anyway through a change in legal baselines, need not condemn random 
experimentation on policies that do not violate rights and are genuine candidates for full 
implementation. Random experimentation might be avoided where the different in treatment, 
regardless of legal baselines, is sufficiently grave. An experiment on the death penalty, though 
potentially useful in resolving a difficult and important empirical debate, would presumably be 
off limits, but that does not necessarily mean that any experiments of alternative sentencing 
approaches would be banned.264 At least some experiments, for example those where the unit of 
                                                 
263 Compare Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to 
the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550 (1992) (arguing for such a right), with Gregory E. Maggs, 
Innovation in Constitutional Law: The Right to Education and the Tricks of the Trade, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1038 (1992) (arguing 
against). 
264 The government, of course, cannot deprive someone of liberty without due process, but a sentencing experiment might well 
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randomization is at the level of a firm in a regulated industry, should probably be permissible 
even without informed consent. 
b. Equality concerns 
Concerns about informed consent focus on the rights of those subject to the experiment. 
Concerns about equality focus on the rights of those who either are randomly excluded from an 
experiment or who are assigned to the less desirable of the treatment and control groups. The 
equality concern is not limited to random experimentation, but extends also to cases in which a 
government with limited resources distributes those resources at random.265 For example, 
governments have used lotteries to distribute scarce low-income housing,266 rights to 
immigrate,267 and positions in magnet and charter schools.268 Maurice Rosenberg points out that 
random experimentation may be inevitably in tension with the “equal protection principle . . . 
that persons subjected to significantly different treatments must be shown to be different in ways 
that supply a reasonable basis for the differences in treatment.”269 If equal protection were 
interpreted to prohibit all arbitrary legal differences among similarly situated individuals, then 
both random experimentation and other programs using random selection to award scarce 
resources must be eliminated. 
There are, however, advantages to using randomization in both these contexts. In the 
experimental context, randomization has benefits already discussed,270 and when scarce 
resources are distributed, randomization ensures that the distribution occurs without favor and in 
a way that limits rent-seeking for scarce resources.271 In the United States, the equal protection 
                                                                                                                                                             
apply to someone who has already received due process. Indeed, even if randomization is problematic in other contexts, 
probabilistic criminal punishments may be permissible, if the randomization is conceived and designed as part of the punishment 
scheme. See, e.g., David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 58-62 (1999) 
(defending punishments where the severity is randomized). 
265 Such distribution has generally raised fewer objections than randomization for experimental purposes alone, and as a result 
experimentation has been particularly feasible in cases in which arbitrary decisions needed to be made in any event. See 
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 225 (noting that in one experiment, randomization “usually became more acceptable” when 
officials “recognized that they did not have sufficient funding to serve their entire caseload and, hence, that some mechanism was 
needed to determine who would be denied services”). 
266 See, e.g., Denise Irene Arnold, Lottery Prize Is Affordable Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1988, at 12 (discussing a local housing 
lottery). 
267 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (providing for distribution of some visas “strictly in a random order”). 
268 See, e.g., Cullen et al., supra note 144 (analyzing such a lottery). 
269 Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1988, at 13, 17. 
270 See supra Part III. 
271 Rent-seeking can still occur if large numbers of individuals may spend money to enter the lottery. See, e.g., Thomas W. 
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justification for tolerating both random experimentation and random assignment of government 
benefits is that there is a rational basis for randomization, and because there is no discrimination 
against a protected class, no higher standard than rational basis review is necessary. So, in any 
event, concludes Judge Friendly’s opinion in the leading case on this issue.272 Judge Friendly 
explained, “The Equal Protection clause does not place a state in a vise where its only choices . . 
. are to do nothing or plunge into statewide action.”273 A court someday might fail to follow or 
even overturn this precedent, but it reinforces the plausibility of the legal argument that 
randomization does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.274 
                                                                                                                                                            
But does randomization of legal requirements violate the core principles of equal 
protection? A full philosophical treatment of this question is beyond this Article’s scope, but 
Ronald Dworkin’s treatment of a related issue deserves attention. Dworkin considers the 
legitimacy of “checkerboard statutes.”275 “Why should Parliament,” he asks, “not make abortion 
criminal for pregnant women who were born in even years but not for those born in odd 
ones?”276 Dworkin imagines such a distinction arising from compromise, never considering the 
possibility that a checkerboard statute might produce useful information. The discussion 
nevertheless is useful in addressing whether arbitrary distinctions inherently violate equality 
principles.277  Dworkin claims that checkerboard statutes offend a principle that he calls 
“integrity.”278 A jurisdiction enacting such a statute as a compromise “must endorse principles to 
justify part of what it has done that it must reject to justify the rest.”279 That does not occur with 
random experimentation, where a single principle, the need to obtain more information, justifies 
both the treatment and control conditions.280 
 
Hazlett & Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from Cellular Telephone License Lotteries, 59 S. ECON. J. 425 
(1993) (analyzing a government lottery that produced 320,000 applications). 
272 Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1108-10 (2d Cir. 1973). 
273 Id. at 1109-10. One commentator has criticized the court for not indicating that its decision would be valid only for as long as 
the experimental program’s value were uncertain. Note, Reforming the One Step at a Time Justification in Equal Protection 
Cases, 90 YALE L.J. 1777, 1783 (1981). 
274 Randomization schemes may sometimes violate other constitutional provisions, however. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648 (1979) (finding random stops of vehicles to check driver’s license and registration inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment). 
275 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178-84 (1986).  
276 Id. at 178. 
277 See id. at 185 (relating the checkerboard statute issue to conceptions of equality). 
278 Id. at 183. 
279 Id. at 184. 
280 Another example of Dworkin’s reaffirms that arbitrary distinctions are acceptable where not simply the result of legislative 
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2. Objections to Self-Execution 
Checkerboard statutes also suggest an objection to self-execution. If checkerboard 
statutes represent inappropriate channeling of political compromise, perhaps self-executing 
statutes should be rejected on the same ground. A justification for self-execution offered above is 
that it may facilitate compromise.281 Sometimes, such a compromise will result in an outcome 
that a policymaker would reject if the policymaker correctly anticipated the result of the 
experiment. But policymakers routinely make compromises in the face of uncertainty. 
Legislators unable to reach agreement often leave issues to be resolved by courts282 or 
administrative agencies. Self-execution is akin to delegation to experimenters. The outcome 
might leave some policymakers disappointed, but this does not make the initial decision 
illegitimate. Lawmakers often enter into incompletely theorized partial agreements when unable 
to agree on deep justifications for policies.283 
Once again, we can imagine extreme hypotheticals. Suppose, for example, that 
conservatives believed (foolishly) that the National League would win the All-Star Game, while 
liberals fervently believed in the American League. Would it be legitimate for the opposing 
factions to make important details of legislation contingent on the game’s outcome? An 
experiment could be so irrelevant to the merits of the policy issue that making the experiment 
self-executing is akin to a coin flip. This would violate the principle that policymakers must 
engage in reasoned decisionmaking. Although a bright line will be elusive, it seems doubtful that 
many legislative experiments would be so unrelated to the substantive legal issues as to make 
this concern salient. 
Self-executing experiments will, however, resolve policy debates based on simplified 
proxies for policy. If a simplified experiment is likely to produce better policy than a more 
elaborate one, however, that should be sufficient justification. Policymakers have no moral 
obligation to increase the quantity of societal knowledge at the expense of policy. Admittedly, if 
                                                                                                                                                             
compromise: “Suppose we can rescue only some prisoners of tyranny; justice hardly requires rescuing none even when only luck, 
not any principle, will decide whom we save and whom we leave to torture.” Id. at 181. 
281 See supra Part II.A.2. 
282 As one example, Congress intentionally left unresolved a critical legal issue in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 
Karen Rosenberg Stein, Comment, Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Decision Not to Decide, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 275, 276 (1993).  
283 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995) (introducing the concept 
of incompletely theorized agreements). 
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the proxy ex ante seems likely to be so poor that policy will effectively be moving in a random 
direction, then the case for self-execution is weak. Similarly, if the policy process improves so 
that it more effectively assimilates expert opinion, more complex experimental designs may be 
preferable. Even so, self-execution could do little harm, shifting the policy baseline but still 
permitting policymakers to make changes if subtle experimental results justified them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued for randomized, self-executing legal experiments. Randomization 
will generally produce more accurate and easily understood information, and self-execution can 
facilitate negotiation and ensure that information from experiments affects the law. Such 
experimentation does not present unique barriers based on concerns of ethics, equality, or 
accountability. Nonetheless, here are trade-offs. Sometimes, the policy process might incorporate 
subtle lessons of more complex experiments, so self-execution may not be needed. At other 
times, effects of nonrandom experimentation might be sufficiently identifiable that 
randomization is unnecessary. And finally, some policy issues may not lend themselves to 
experimentation of any form. The absence of randomized experiments with clear effects on 
policy, however, suggests that experimentation is underused. Conceptualization of 
experimentation not merely as an academic exercise, but as a standard part of the policy process, 
is a first step toward identifying and implementing experiments that could potentially improve 
policy. 
